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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the way in which the United States formulated its policy toward
Greece during the Greek civil war (1943-1949). It asserts that U.S. intervention in Greece was
based on circumstantial evidence and the assumption of Soviet global intentions, rather than on
dispatches from the field which consistently reported from 1943-1946 that the Soviets were not
involved in that country’s affairs. It also maintains that the post-Truman Doctrine American
policy in Greece was in essence, a continuation of British policy there from 1943-1946, which
meant to impose an unpopular government on the people of Greece, and tolerated unlawful
violence of the extreme Greek right-wing.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 1947 while the British were on the verge of ending all assistance to Greece,
President Harry Truman stood before the United States Congress and the American people to ask
for unprecedented American funds for military and economic assistance for both Greece and
Turkey so that those countries could resist falling into the Soviet Bloc. According to the
administration, the Soviets intended to take over Greece by using the Greek Communist Party
(KKE) as their instrument. The simultaneous pressure applied on Turkey for joint-use of their
Dardanelle Straits was supposedly coordinated with their actions in Greece, and thus aimed at
establishing regional hegemony. Although the President never mentioned the Soviets in his
speech, his rhetoric was sufficiently transparent for the audience to understand to whom he was
referring. Conjuring up visions of a terrifying world dominated by communists, President
Truman was successful in his quest to “scare the hell out of the American people” in order to
receive the funding he sought.1
The declaration of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 marked a turning point in
American foreign relations as the United States continued its shift from one of isolationism to
one of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is widely viewed as the starting point of
what would become known as America’s “containment” policy – a rigid response and projection
of American strength deemed necessary to combat the perceived Soviet intentions to communize
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Robert A. Divine, Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 170. In meetings
with congressional leaders to discuss American aid to Greece and Turkey, Senator Arthur Vandenberg suggested
that the President make an appearance in front of Congress in order to “scare the hell out of the country” in order to
gain public support.

the world. The origin of this new American position in world affairs – or so it appeared at the
time – stemmed from the situation that occurred in Greece in the last two-thirds of the 1940s.
The Greek civil war was, at first, a domestic conflict that played out as a result of decades
of political instability in Greece. After World War II, the conflict took on broader international
significance and became the first military conflict of the Cold War. It was fought in three
separate phases from 1943 to 1949 between political adherents of both the Greek left and Greek
right. By the end of the conflict, 80,000 were killed in the fighting, 5000 had been executed,
50,000 were imprisoned, 140,000 fled the nation, and 700,000 were internally displaced.2
Upon their decision to buttress one side in the Greek domestic conflict, the United States
committed vast amounts of military, economic, and logistical support to the Greek government
from 1947-1950 in order to prevent Greece from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. But
the way in which the United States developed the policy that committed itself to the defense of
the Greek anti-communist government requires further clarification. This thesis attempts to
highlight what information American statesmen received from the field, the level of accuracy of
that information, whether or not policymakers trusted and applied the information to the
formation of policy, and how their understanding of the global situation affected the way in
which they intervened in Greece’s civil war.
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Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece, (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 178-179; David Close, The
Origins of the Greek Civil War, (New York: Longman Group Limited, 1995), 219-220.
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Historiography

This work embraces two distinct historiographical fields: that of the Greek civil war, and
that of the formation of the Truman Doctrine. The review of the former is necessary in order to
trace the evolution of scholar’s views on the origin and dynamics of the Greek civil war. The
brief review of the latter is meant to better situate this work within the rich and constantly
growing field of the history of American foreign policy in the early post-World War II years.
The historiography of civil war Greece is marked most notably by competing views on
when the war actually took place, as early histories of the civil war were derived from
ideological considerations. The historiographical landscape evolved from politically charged
“traditionalist” histories until the 1970s, then shifted to “revisionist” histories of the left, and
ultimately to a more balanced “post-revisionist” perspective after the fall of the Soviet Union.3
The earliest histories of the civil war were produced outside of Greece, only a few years
after the conflict, and by actors who took part in it. In most of the early historical works, the
issue of attributing blame for the civil war was a central topic, with most of them giving that
distinction to the wartime Allied resistance organization, the National Liberation Front (EAM)
whose leadership was comprised of Greek communists, and its armed wing, the Greek People’s
Liberation Army (ELAS). Historians also argued about the role of external forces in the conflict
with British, American, and Soviet roles examined. The earliest histories of Greek civil war were
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Cultural and social histories have also made an appearance into the contemporary discourse on the civil war. See
Mark Mazower, After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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written in the paranoid context of the Cold War with a reliance on western sources, and made the
assumption that the Soviets controlled the Greek communists.4
A commonly held trend among the early historians was to look at the war in the concept
of “rounds”, all three of which constituted different phases of supposed communist attempts at
revolution in Greece. In this perspective the first round marked the fighting that occurred
between the various Greek resistance groups while Greece was occupied by Nazi Germany. The
second round designated the fighting in Athens between EAM/ELAS and British soldiers from
December 1944 to February 1945, ending with ELAS’ retreat and the signing of the Varkiza
Agreement in March 1945.5 All other events in the civil war supposedly constituted the third
round of the conflict which lasted until 1949. Looking at the civil war in concepts of “rounds”
however, assumed a ubiquitous, systematic attempt on the part of Greek communists to seize
power in Greece from 1943 to 1949. The result of this first phase of historical writing was a onesided portrayal of the way events had unfolded.6
A revisionist approach in the 1970’s helped to bring about a more balanced depiction of
the civil war and the strategy of the Greek communists. John Iatrides made the earliest attempt to
reinterpret the events of civil war. His book, Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist “Second
Round” was published in 1972 and incorporated the writings of U.S. ambassador to the Greek

4

The use of Winston Churchill and Harry S. Truman’s memoirs and autobiographies are a few examples of the
western perspective in the early literature.
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The Varkiza Agreement was the truce that temporarily ended hostilities between the British and Greek government
forces, and EAM. Under the agreement, EAM’s armed wing ELAS was to trade its weapons in order to be
incorporated into a coalition with the right-wing nationalists. The agreement was not adhered to by either.
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For traditionalist interpretation of the civil war, see C.M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek
Politics in Their International Setting (Reston: 1948); and, George D. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story
of the Greek Communist Party. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
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government, Lincoln MacVeagh. According to Iatrides, the conflict in Athens between
EAM/ELAS and the British in December 1945 was the result of misunderstandings on the part of
both, rather than an attempt by the communists to seize power. He contended that in the vacuum
created in the wake of German withdrawal, neither side knew what the other’s aspirations were,
and this uncertainty led to the bloody events that neither side wanted.7
In 1981 Lawrence Wittner, author of American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, posed
that contrary to earlier accounts that viewed the communists in Greece as an extension of Soviet
power, Stalin had been mostly uninterested in Greek affairs. Wittner based this assertion on the
fact that the Soviet Military Mission, which visited EAM/ELAS headquarters in the summer of
1944 directed the organization to agree to the demands of the exiled Greek government, in what
surely must have amounted to a stunning blow to them. 8 As further evidence that Stalin did not
support armed revolution from Greek communists, the author highlighted Stalin and Churchill’s
“percentages agreement” which divided Eastern Europe into “spheres of influence” and claimed
that Stalin would by no means risk his position in other areas of Europe for what he deemed a
relatively unimportant strategic position in Greece.9 His book also highlighted many of the
misperceptions that earlier historians had put forth which implied continued communists
attempts to seize power. This study, as he boldly proclaimed, “bolster[ed] the revisionist case.”10
He gave recognition to EAM/ELAS for their contributions to the resistance movement and

7

John O. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist “Second Round,” 1944-1945 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1972).
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Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1982), 8.
9

Ibid., 52.
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Ibid., xi.
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showed that, “in the course of the war, EAM pinned down 300,000 enemy troops; accounted for
enemy casualties in the tens of thousands; frustrated fascist plans for labor conscription;
sabotaged German transportation, supply and communications networks; and rescued thousands
of prisoners of war, Jews, and Allied airmen from occupation forces.”11 Wittner also commented
on the make-up of the communist-controlled EAM that consisted not only of communists as was
perceived, but also republican officers, clergymen, peasants, and women.12 Additionally, the
author highlighted the level of U.S. involvement in Greek politics once they arrived in Greece,
and the lengths the Americans went to in order to keep communists out of Greece.
In 1989, Peter J. Stavrakis, a historian specializing in the study of Stalin and Soviet
policy published Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949. The author challenged both the
traditionalists and revisionists on the impracticality of both camp’s positions regarding the KKE
and Soviet aims in Greece. He claimed that neither explanation – that is, that the Greek
communists were an extension of Soviet advances, or that Stalin was completely uninterested in
Greece – was sufficient to describe the actions of Soviet policy-makers regarding Greece.13
Viewing the conflict in larger terms as power politics, Stavrakis claimed that Soviet policy in
Greece was dynamic and it evolved. “The most intriguing aspect of Soviet policy during this
period is not its constancy, but its variability,” he asserted. According to Stavrakis, Stalin had
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Ibid., 3
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Ibid.
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Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949 (London: Cornell University Press, 1989); See
also, Peter J. Stavrakis, “Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control: The Case of Greece, 1944-1949” in John O.
Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, (London: University
Park, 1995)
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several uses for Greece.14 The author claimed that at the end of World War II, Stalin’s main
concern had been to secure his immediate borders. Greece figured into Stalin’s plans, but only as
a pawn for free reign in Romania. This was Stalin’s only use for Greece from mid-1944 to mid1945.15 Stavrakis also noted that Stalin went on to pursue a strategy of “political gradualism” to
avoid waking the Americans to Greece, and in essence, he desired that EAM slowly build their
influence within the legal confines of a coalition government. This strategy stemmed from the
desire to “achieve the elimination of the western presence [in Greece].”16 Essentially, Stavrakis
argued that Stalin was indeed interested in Greece, but in a much different way than the British,
U.S. policy makers, and earlier historians of the civil war had assumed. Regarding the defeat of
the Greek communists, the author is most critical of Stalin, because of his failure to
communicate a clear political objective to the Greek communists from 1944 to 1947 despite their
requests for such advice.
In 1995, David Close’s The Origins of the Greek Civil War provided an excellent
overview of the civil war and traced its beginnings back to the early 20th century which resulted
in a “National Schism” and the political discord which followed from successive repressive
right-wing Greek governments. Taking advantage of British, American, and Greek sources –
both communist and non-communist – recently released memoirs, and a vast conglomeration of
secondary sources, Close’s work provided a vivid portrait of the Greek civil war and placed
blame on all parties involved – the British, Americans, Greek communists, and Greek right-wing
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Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 3.
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Ibid., 4
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Stavrakis, “Soviet Policy in Areas,” 228.
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for the events that played out in Greece. The author shed new light on the unofficial machine of
persecution known as the “White Terror”, that amounted to an “informal alliance of army
officers, National Guards, police, armed thugs, political organizations” and gendarmerie, which
altogether became known as the “Shadow State.” This unholy alliance, Close claimed, promoted
and carried out extreme violence and persecution against the Greek left from the beginning of
1945 well past the end of the war in 1949. 17
In the mid 1990s, several collections of essays were also produced which addressed the
history of the Greek civil war. The most extensive and significant of these, Greece at the
Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, edited by John Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, was
published in 1995.18 One essay, “The 1940’s Between Past and Future,” by George
Mavrogordatos asserted that the Greek fratricide was purely a domestic conflict. Mavrogordatos
views events of the war as a continuation of the polarizing effects of the interwar period in
Greece, and links the civil war to the “National Schism” to which the civil war was a sui generis
resolution.19 The onus for the war, Mavrogordatos claims, was the monarch’s polarizing
installation of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936. The author highlights how the “radical
republicanism” born in the wake of the dictatorship’s repressive tendencies had joined forces
with the KKE to form the massive organization of EAM/ELAS. His study also showed how the

17

Close, The Origins, 156.

18

John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy (London:
University Park, 1995).
19

George Mavrogordatos, “The 1940’s Between Past and Future,” in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, eds.,
Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, (London: University Park, 1995), 31
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post-World War II Greek right tried to keep power by promoting the perception that the entire
spectrum of the left in Greece was communist.20
Another contributor to this collection also places the conflict in the domestic rather than
the international realm. Ole L. Smith, in “Communist Perceptions, Strategy, and Tactics, 19451949” used new sources – specifically the Greek communist Central Committee’s Twelfth
Plenum Conferences and political decisions of their Seventh Congress – that he claimed
supported the revisionist interpretations. Smith claimed that, “the KKE’s strategic goal was to
create a representative government with EAM’s participation, a government that would be able
to bridge the political gulf created by the war and to safeguard gains toward a fully democratic
Greece.”21 Smith concluded that “what triggered [civil war] developments were not initiatives of
the KKE, but the measures taken by the Greek government…including the escalation of rightist
violence in the wake of the parliamentary elections of March 1946.”22
In 2001, Thanasis D. Sfikas shed additional light on the strategies of the Greek
communists during the civil war by using declassified archival materials in Athens. In “War and
Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945-1949,” Sfikas shows that the
KKE’s actions during the civil war cannot be defined in terms of a singular objective, and claims
that “the choices facing the KKE changed quite dramatically – more than once – in the years
from 1945-1949.”23 The author asserts that there were three distinct phases of Greek communist

20

Ibid., 32
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Ole L. Smith, “Communist Perceptions, Strategy, and Tactics, 1945 – 1949,” in John O. Iatrides and Linda
Wrigley, eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, (London: University Park, 1995), 93
22

Ibid., 96
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Thanasis D. Sfikas, “War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945-1949,” Journal of
Cold War Studies, 3, no.3 (Fall 2001), 6.
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actions which “revolved around competing concepts of war and peace.” First, the military
actions they resorted to in 1946 aimed at restoring the KKE’s position it had before fighting
broke out in December 1944 between the communists and the British. Secondly, until early
1947, the KKE worked towards a compromise, “and used the threat of insurrection to bring
additional pressure to bear on the government.” Lastly, in 1947 Greek communists “stepped up
[their] war effort…to force a settlement” because the alternative to this “was a capitulation under
conditions and terms infinitely worse” than those of the White Terror.24 Sfikas’ study added
further legitimacy to the revisionist claim that the civil war in Greece cannot be looked at in
terms of continued communist attempts at seizure of power – or rounds.
Adding to the discourse on the KKE’s goals, in his 2005 article, “Revolution or SelfDefense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War”, John Iatrides
attempted in his own words, to “reach definitive and documented conclusions” about the goals of
the KKE. Using declassified documents of former KKE leaders, Iatrides places the onus of their
defeat on Stalin for his failure to propagate a clear plan and notes that the KKE’s “grave
miscalculations concerning its foreign patrons as well as its adversaries caused it to launch its
armed revolution at the wrong time and under conditions that doomed it to defeat.”25 In laying
the blame for the KKE’s defeat on Stalin, Iatrides’ study also helped to dispel earlier notions that
the KKE was an instrument of Soviet policy.

24

Ibid., 30.
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John O. Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War,”
Journal of Cold War Studies, 7, no.3 (Summer 2005), 32.
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British and U.S. policy towards Greece during the civil war and post-war years was also
examined in numerous articles and monographs. G.M. Alexander’s The Prelude to the Truman
Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944-1947 published in 1982, surveys British involvement in
the political affairs of Greece from the end of occupation until the assumption by the United
States as the leading player in Greek affairs. Using declassified British Foreign Office archival
materials, Alexander points to western interests in the Middle East as the main reason for British
and subsequent American involvement in Greece. Additionally, he focuses on the struggle of the
British to reign in a reactionary right and their failure to place in Greece a constitutional
monarchy, the form of government they so badly desired in Greece.26 Alexander’s book is
particularly useful in viewing British attitudes toward Greece, but its weakness consists of a
tendency to view the civil war in the traditionalist view as a continuous and sustained effort by
EAM and the communists to create a revolution in Greece.
In “A New Kind of War” America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece,
(1989), Howard Jones provides insight into U.S. perceptions of Soviet actions leading up to the
Truman Doctrine of March 1947. Jones asserts that U.S. policymakers attached global
significance to the Greek situation because of their belief that the Soviets were involved there.
Jones, like Alexander and Wittner, also highlights American material interests in the
Mediterranean and Middle East as a large contributing factor to intervention. By using American
correspondence records, the author acknowledges that Greece’s problems were domestic and not
driven by the Soviets, but claimed that, in light of Soviet actions elsewhere in Europe,
“Americans had to act on the basis of circumstantial evidence, an intelligence network that was
26

Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, 8-9.
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not always accurate in its assessments, and a deep suspicion of Soviet communist
involvement.”27 Although a highly valuable work, Jones’ book is lacking in information from
American sources on the ground in Greece prior to the few months before the formulation of the
Truman doctrine.
In the spring of 2000, John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos together penned “The
International Dimension of the Greek Civil War,” an article which asserts that, although the
traditional view of looking at the war in terms of sustained communist “rounds” inaccurately
blamed the communists for hostilities in Greece, there indeed were three “phases” to the war.
But the authors claim that each phase was “distinct in the sense that each had its specific
domestic and international realities, its own immediate causes and dynamic, and, to a large
extent, its own cast of characters.”28 The article examines the international aspect of all three
phases of the war and surveys British, Soviet, and American intentions and actions in Greece.
The authors also show the extent of both British and American involvement in controlling Greek
politics in their respective phases. Summing up their findings, Iatrides and Rizopoulos strongly
assert that, “we now know – with a high degree of certainty – that, for his own good reasons,
Stalin did not, in fact, encourage or significantly assist the Greek communists at any stage during
the years 1942-1949.”29 But the authors do concede that, without British and U.S. intervention,
the Greek communists “would have turned Greece into (at best) a Titoist ‘worker’s paradise.’”30
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Howard Jones, “A New Kind of War:” America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 5.
28

John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “The International Dimension of the Greek Civil War,” World
Policy Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 2000), 88..
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In 2005, Iatrides shifted the focus of his studies to American involvement in the Greek
civil war by surveying George F. Kennan’s analysis of Russian motives in the post-WWII era
and by showing how his analysis related to American intervention in Greece. In “George F.
Kennan and the Birth of Containment: The Greek Test Case,” Iatrides shows how, despite
perceptions in Washington at the time, for Stalin, “Greece was a marginal battle in the emerging
Cold War that he had not initiated but that he would have liked to win so long as it did not put at
risk his newly acquired empire in Eastern Europe.” Conversely, for the Americans, the Greek
civil war “served as the first test of a grand strategy – to oppose what they perceived as Soviet
expansion – which they were anxious to launch and determined to win.”31 Iatrides emphasized
that even before Kennan’s broad analysis of Soviet intentions, “a yet-to-be-defined strategy of a
more ‘muscular response’ to perceived Soviet challenges was already taking shape” when Harry
Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945.32 Essentially, Kennan’s analysis strengthened
those suspicions.33 In light of this fact, Iatrides claims that the Greek civil war and the Truman
doctrine were fundamentally linked to one another because civil war in Greece “without any
doubt helped trigger the Truman Doctrine” and “put to the test…Kennan’s initial formulation of
the policy of containment.” The author suggests that the Truman Doctrine was both a success
and a failure, claiming that, in military terms of blocking the Soviets, it “certainly contributed in
keeping Greece outside the Iron Curtain.” While on the other hand, “as an agent of major

31
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(Fall, 2005), 141.
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institutional reform and democratization…[it] proved ineffective.”34 This article is of tremendous
importance because it seeks to converge the study of the formulation of American policy in
Greece vis-à-vis events on the ground there.
The analysis of the preceding historical developments demonstrates that historian’s views
of the civil war and its dynamics have changed drastically from the 1950s to the present time.
While arguments about the intentions of Greek communists are still part of the contemporary
discourse, in the international realm, historical consensus has mostly been reached regarding the
lack of Soviet involvement in the conflict.
During the Greek Civil War (1943-1949), United States intelligence and diplomatic
resources reported to policy makers in Washington that there was no evidence which linked
Greek communist activities to the Soviet Union, nor could they find any evidence that showed an
attempt by the Soviets to foment armed insurrection by the Greek Communist Party. The
situation was probed time and again, but American resources in the field had mostly discounted
Soviet involvement there from 1943-1946.
Existing evidence suggests that Moscow’s plans for Eastern Europe worked against the
KKE’s progress in Greece from 1943-1947, and that Stalin was willing to use Greek communists
as a pawn for a free hand in countries such as Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria towards the end of
World War II and into the post-war period. The United States had some idea of this. Although
there was no actual proof that the Soviets controlled the Greek communists or desired Greece in
their security belt, the British, and subsequently the United States were unwilling to bet on this,

34

Ibid., 143.
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and were willing to use any means necessary to ensure that Greece stayed out of the sphere of
Soviet influence.
By 1946, Soviet actions in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, and their stated interest in the
Turkish Straits led U.S. policymakers to believe it was inevitable that Greece was next in line for
Soviet strategic and expansionist policies - albeit with no intelligence that explicitly proved this.
Together, the administration and Congress worked on a plan that would allow the administration
the ability to mobilize public support for extensive aid to the Greek and Turkish governments.
The public campaign was successful and led to unprecedented economic and military aid to
Greece by the summer of 1947.
Certain issues however, are in need of further clarification. The first issue concerns the
relationship between the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the developments in Greece:
what was the evidence upon which President Truman built his case on developments in Greece
and Soviet aims there? Did his views reflect a consensus among intelligence sources, diplomats,
and the State Department? Was policy toward Greece based on a massive intelligence failure that
provided an unclear picture of the situation, or was this a case of a conscientious manipulation of
American public opinion by the President, designed to gain support for broader international
initiatives based on the global situation? Another issue that requires additional clarification is
that of the similarities of British and American policy in 1940s Greece.
Studies on the Greek civil war have noticeably lacked in their attention to the genesis of
American involvement in the conflict, and studies on the formation of the Truman doctrine either
gloss over the pre-Doctrine events in Greece, or hold the “traditionalist” interpretation of the
Greek civil war. Also lacking are studies that compare British and American practices towards
15

Greece during the civil war. My thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap that exists between the
historiographies of the Greek civil war and the formation of the Truman Doctrine. It also
purports to trace continuity between British and American policy.
In this thesis, I will argue that U.S. policy on civil war Greece gradually shifted from
non-involvement to massive intervention based not on evidence from the field that pointed to
Soviet involvement in the conflict, but rather, the perceptions of Soviet actions in Eastern
Europe. Additionally, it will be argued that once the United States became involved in Greece,
their policy reflected a striking similarity to previous British policy there, which consistently
tolerated right-wing violence and a corrupt Greek government, and continuously attempted to
hide their level of involvement in Greece’s political affairs.
In my primary source research, I have relied mostly on the Foreign Relations of the
United States series published by the United States Department of State, years 1941-1949.35
This source presents the official documented record of U.S. foreign policy and the diplomatic
activity of the United States. The Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from
presidential libraries, the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, Congressional and
Senate hearings, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals
involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy.
It was also determined necessary to obtain access to reports from the United States
intelligence network during the period under review. Although I was unable to access these
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records from the National Archives, I was still able to view some of the most important reports
from operatives in the field thanks to Richard Clogg’s compilation of primary sources titled,
Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War – A Documentary History which includes
reports from the United States Office of Strategic Services, (OSS), the predecessor to the Central
Intelligence Agency.36 These records are important because they provide information on how
diplomats and leaders received their information from operatives in the field.
In the following, I present developments in Greece in both their domestic and
international contexts, as well as British and American perceptions of them. My account is
developed, for the most part, chronologically. Chapter one is a succinct explanation of Greece’s
pre-World War II domestic issues leading up to the occupation of the country and traces the rise
of the Greek communists. It also concisely highlights the international situation towards the end
of World War II. In order to understand British policy and highlight its aspects that were similar
to America’s subsequent efforts in Greece, chapters two and three focus on events on the ground
there, the handling of the situation by the British, American views of that British involvement,
and American perceptions of Soviet involvement in the Greek conflict. Chapter four focuses on
the differences in perceptions from Washington and by American officials in Greece regarding
Soviet involvement there, and the process in which American sources in Greece adjusted their
reports to the changing moods in the U.S. capital. It additionally focuses on similarities between
British and American involvement.
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CHAPTER ONE: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF
THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

This chapter surveys both the Greek domestic and broader international situations prior to
the outbreak of civil war in Greece. It argues that preconditions of the civil war lay in decades of
political instability that had been building in the country since World War I. It also shows how
the international developments pit two super powers in a perceived ideological stance against
one another.

Domestic Background:

Prior to World War II, Greece had not been a model of political or national harmony. The
political divisions inherent in Greece stemmed from the World War I era when much of Greece’s
population was divided over whether to support the monarchy and join the Triple Alliance
(Germany, Austria, and the Ottomans) or the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). A very
small majority of popular opinion resided on the support of the latter, and found its hero in
liberal republican politician Eleftherios Venizelos; but a considerable portion of Greeks still
remained loyal to the monarch. The rift became defined in terms of the liberal republican left
versus the monarchist right, and by the time World War I was over, the relative pre-war political
stability that Greece had enjoyed was replaced by bitter divisions that would last for generations.
This split is commonly referred to in Greece as the “National Schism.”

18

A new organization also arrived on the Greek political scene during the first half of the
20th century, as the Greek communist party (KKE) made their first significant political
appearance in Greek politics during the early part of 1936. While the left-leaning Venizelists and
their anti-Venizelist foes jockeyed for political power, King George II of Greece made an
attempt (under British pressure) to reign as a constitutional monarch and restore some semblance
of collaborative government. By his orders, elections were held in January 1936. The results
were a practical deadlock between the Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, with the former holding
142 parliamentary seats, and the later, 143. Neither was able to affect useful government on its
own, and in essence, the government had reached a state of paralysis that created fear,
frustration, and anger throughout Greek society. Most of Greece’s social classes called for action
as discontent with the government was widespread. Greece’s small industrial proletariat shocked
Greece with a wave of strikes during the spring of 1936, and in the January elections, they had
15 members of the communist party elected to parliament. Subsequently, neither the Venizelists
or anti-Venizelists could attain any majority, or get anything done without the support of the
communists.37
In August 1936, as economic, social, and political discontent in Greece reached a
breaking point, King George II, in preparation for rumored labor strikes, placed General Ioannis
Metaxas as dictator. Metaxas subsequently instituted a broad policy of right-wing terror in order
to quash the discontented left-wing and take back control of Greece in the midst of the chaotic
political climate. The ferocity with which he instituted the suppression of dissenters of all
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political persuasions, but especially of socialists and communists, created solidarity within the
left that was eventually capitalized on by the KKE.38
In October 1940, fascist Italy demanded that Greece surrender to its army, a request that
was denied by the Greek dictator who on the spot exclaimed “Ohi!” (No!). Subsequently, Italy
attempted to invade Greece, but was surprisingly pushed back into Yugoslavia by Greek military
and voluntary forces.39
The Greek success in fighting off the Italian invaders ensured that Hitler’s war machine
would be needed to smash the Greek state, which it did with the help of its Bulgarian allies in
April 1941.40 The official Greek government - including the king - fled Greece to Turkey, then to
Crete, and finally to Cairo until the war was over. The question of the monarch’s return after
war’s end was one that would help inflame the already growing political tensions. 41 A brutally
vicious occupation by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria ensued.
After the Greek government had fled the country, numerous Greek resistance forces were
formed in the midst of the occupation; the most popular and effective of which was the National
Liberation Front (EAM). By 1944, EAM was by far the leading resistance group in Greece, with
an estimated 2 million followers and an army of about 50,000 armed soldiers.42 Although it was
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comprised of a broad base of Greeks from many political persuasions, many of EAM’s
controlling elites were members of the KKE. Communists were at an advantage in this period,
best suited to excel in occupation conditions because conspiratorial activity was not something
new to its leaders. Many Greeks were disillusioned with the parties of the extreme right, the
conservative parties, and the exiled Greek government, and saw no harm in collaborating with
the communists. To many Greeks the communists and EAM had shown themselves to be
“courageous and daring opponents to the Axis” and they were doubtlessly impressed by the
Western Powers’ alliance with the Soviet Union.43
Other resistance bands existed in Greece during the early 1940s, such as the right-wing
National Democratic Hellenic League (EDES), which gave its allegiance to Greece’s exiled king,
but had followers on a much smaller scale, with armed combatants estimated at about tenthousand. EAM and EDES not only harassed the foreign occupiers in early 1940s Greece, but
also each other in an attempt to assert political power in what would surely be a devastated
nation once the war was over. During the occupation, each group was supplied with military
support from the allies, mostly from the British, who had historically propped up Greece since
her independence from the Ottoman’s in 1831.44 The British deemed Greece as vital to the
strategic and imperial aims of the English empire which included a water route to the Suez
Canal, and the southern Balkan corridor into the Middle East oil supply.
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The Rise of the KKE and the National Liberation Front

Along with most of the left in Greece, the KKE was neutralized by the repressive
Metaxas regime from 1936 to 1941. Eighteen years before the dictatorship, the Greek
Communist Party had been formed in 1918 in the wake of the October revolution in Russia.
After the Italian invasion and German occupation however, the Greek communists evolved from
a static unit into the core of the most cohesive and dynamic wartime resistance movement.45 The
organization was comprised of political progressives; intellectuals, professors, and writers from
the organization spread “civilization” to the countryside. Along with them came hospitals,
literacy, and education. EAM also integrated women into it’s movement, a demographic that had
been completely marginalized in Greece historically. By the end of 1943, EAM had liberated
much of the countryside from German control, and enjoyed support from the masses in the cities
as well as the countryside.46
EAM had initially gained popularity in Greece during the resistance against the Italian
invaders and later on for its ability to liberate areas outside the cities. Additionally, people in
occupied cities were excited about the rumors of areas freed from occupation by EAM.
Logistical successes also helped the prestige of EAM and its armed wing ELAS which started
out as a force of 300 bandits but eventually boasted numbers of up to fifty-thousand soldiers.47
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At the end of 1943, EAM/ELAS held the majority of support in the countryside as well as
the towns, and support was overwhelming in the working-class districts of Athens.48 The
Germans initially had trouble in setting up a puppet government in Greece due to the effective
resistance organizations, but by April 1943, as they had done in France and Spain, they created a
collaborationist puppet government in Greece under Greek General Ioannis Rallis. The Rallis
government employed many of Greece’s right-wing politicians, military leaders, and much of
Greece’s “old guard” in government positions. They also created an armed wing in the winter of
1943 known as the Security Battalions.49 As early as the end of 1943, while the Allied victory
was still not a foregone conclusion, the British would consider harnessing the Security Battalions
as a check to EAM/ELAS power. By October of 1944, with the exception of Athens, nearly all
of Greece was under the control of the resistance group EAM which boasted the support of about
half the population of Greece.50

Global Context:

The prestige gained by the United States and the Soviet Union due to their war efforts
and glorious victories foreshadowed a bipolar conflict that would mark the beginning of half a
century of animosity between the two superpowers. As World War II was in its closing stages
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and the allies were heading toward victory, Britain’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean was
waning. A devastated, war-torn Europe and Asia needed to be rebuilt physically, politically, and
economically. Popular communist movements challenged traditional political structures in many
countries that had been affected by the war, most notably in China, Italy, France, Yugoslavia,
and Greece.
In terms of human sacrifice, the Soviet Union suffered exponentially more than any other
allied power with casualties roughly estimated at 27 million. Human sacrifice, combined with the
historical threat of the invasion of Russia from the outside led Soviet policymakers to form
security of its borders through “buffer states” as one of its major concerns.51 America, who
looked to take Britain’s place among the world’s strongest nations, was fast becoming the
leading county to symbolize representative democracy and political freedom throughout the
world in contrast to its totalitarian Soviet counterpart.
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CHAPTER TWO: ALLIED VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE
FROM OCCUPATION TO EAM/ELAS DEFEAT (1942-1945)

This chapter surveys the events from 1942-1944 which led to the withdraw of German
troops from Greece. It argues that there existed a growing hostility towards EAM/ELAS in
British governing circles, that the British showed an outright preference for right-wing groups
over the Greek-left, and that the British considered using wartime collaborators as a check to
EAM/ELAS power. It also argues that Americans were generally critical of how the British
handled the Greek situation during this period, even though British officials repeatedly tried to
persuade the United States to come to their line of thinking in Greece.
The Germans entered northern Greece in April 1941 and by May most of Greece was in
the beginning stages of a brutally oppressive occupation. By September 1941, the resistance
groups that had formed inside Greece were complicating Hitler’s plans. Published American
documents during this phase show no mention of any resistance groups nor their makeup,
possibly because the U.S. had not officially joined the war until the very end of 1941 and stayed
relatively out of the European sphere until the end of 1943.
In the modern period, Britain had played the role of dominant power in the eastern
Mediterranean, while also assuming responsibility for the defense of Greece. By World War I,
Britain could claim to be the single major external force in Greek affairs. In November 1942,
EAM/ELAS, with the help of the British, scored a major blow against German supply lines
through Greece with the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge, a major link in the German
supply line route for German General Erwin Rommel’s troops in Africa. Official U.S. documents
25

from the State Department as well as other intelligence outlets make no mention of the Greek
success in this operation, nor of those who played a role in it, most likely because American
resources were focused on theaters of war considered more important, such as the war in the
Pacific. Also important to note, is that the Americans did not send significant intelligence
resources into Greece until late in 1943. When the Americans started to survey events in Greece,
their interest was comprised mostly of monitoring how the British were handling the situation.
Although the U.S. had only a small number of diplomats in Greece prior to the German
occupation, the British sent vast amounts of correspondence regarding the Greek situation to the
U.S. State Department. One of the central issues below is whether and to what extent the
Americans trusted the British assessments of the situation in Greece. Based on the evidence at
hand, it is clear that neither policymaking elites in Washington, nor their counterparts in the field
trusted the British line. Nevertheless, the U.S. did eventually gain information through their own
diplomatic presence. Around 200 U.S. officers from the OSS went into Greece starting in
September of 1943, compared to 400 British officers of the Special Operations Executive (SOE),
who entered the country the year before. 52
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English and American Views of Developments in Greece, and British Policy There (April 1941
– February 1944)

EAM/ELAS had mass support among Greece’s population during the occupation. But
despite all of the aspects that endeared EAM/ELAS to much of the Greek population, the
organization could not escape the one designation that made it impossible for the British, and
especially Winston Churchill to support them: the fact that many known communists were in
high positions in the organization played a large part in the refusal of the British to support them.
To Churchill, accepting inclusion of EAM into the Greek government would be tantamount to
giving Greece to the Soviets. But by 1943, EAM/ELAS had emerged as the most formidable
opponent to British visions of a friendly ally in post-war Greece.53 It seems that towards the end
of 1942, the British became aware that their military and political interests were pulling in
opposite directions; for the wartime effort demanded the use of EAM/ELAS for their exceptional
resistance activities, yet long-term political concerns required some sort of counter to growing
communist power.54
In May 1943, British officials showed their anxieties at the prospects of a government in
Greece headed by EAM. British Deputy Director of Military Intelligence Colonel T. Thornton
after having surveyed these prospects, concluded:
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Our aim in Greece is to prepare an efficient force ready to co-operate with us in the reoccupation of the country and the installment of a stable government. EAM cannot be
relied on to give us such co-operation.55

The admission by Thornton showed a growing trend of disdain for the leftist EAM amongst the
British, quite possibly due to lingering suspicions about its communist leadership.
The British, and more specifically, Winston Churchill gave King George II unfettered
support from the outset. In Britain’s best case scenario, Greece would become a constitutional
monarchy, run by the elite, which would guarantee close relations between the two countries and
secure British interests. According to Winston Churchill, the king had remained a loyal ally
against Axis aggressions. That the king had previously aligned himself with the right-wing
dictatorship of General Metaxas in 1936 was not held against him by the British, for some
believed that the conduct of Greece’s political leaders left him no choice but to tighten his
control on the country through Metaxas’ dictatorship.56
The British and Churchill were willing to do whatever it took to guarantee that Greece
would not fall under communist influence, even if it meant supporting groups who collaborated
with the enemy during the war. At the beginning of 1943, the British began to treat
preferentially, the rivals of EAM/ELAS. As early as March 1943, the British were able to get
right-wing resistance groups EDES and the National/Social Liberation Movement (EKKA) to
pledge their support to the Greek monarch, regardless of the fact both organizations were
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“havens for right-wing officers and gendarmes.”57 In March 1943, Churchill sent a cable to the
British Minister of State in Cairo, that stated, “subject to operational necessity, [the SOE] should
always veer in the direction of groups willing to support the king.”58
But Churchill’s respect and support for the king was not shared by the Greeks
themselves. Greek opposition to the return of the king was widespread throughout Greece. Early
in 1943, with the goal of polling Greek attitudes toward the post-occupation restoration of the
king, Britain sent a military mission into the mountains of Greece. The findings of the mission
showed an almost universal opposition to the restoration of the Greek monarch; these attitudes
were formed by the 1936 installation of the Metaxas regime that was more closely affiliated
ideologically with Nazism and Fascism than republicanism.59
Initially, the British Foreign Office and Churchill discounted the findings on the
assumption that Greece’s political appetite for republicanism had been squashed by the Metaxas
dictatorship. But British assumptions started to change in mid-1943 when their ambassador to the
Greek government-in-exile (GIE) Reginald Leeper visited Cairo in July for discussions with the
GIE cabinet. Leeper found that republicanism was still a strong force in Greek politics, and he
surmised that the British desire for a restoration of the monarchy could not come without some
sort of compromise. He subsequently convinced Churchill and the Foreign Office that the king
needed to try to appease the republican wave in Greece, and at the behest of the British, King
George II agreed that six months after Greece was liberated a plebiscite would be held and the
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results respected on the subject of the structure of the Greek government. The issue to be decided
was whether Greece would become a republic or remain a monarchy.60
The question of how to structure the GIE was not the only issue that concerned the
British. By 1943, EAM/ELAS held prominent positions in Greece and the expansion of their
influence in mid-1943 led to increasing tensions between EAM and other resistance
organizations. A British officer remarked in May 1943 that “a state of undeclared war [existed]
between ELAS and EDES…with each side constantly arresting the other’s members.”61 ELAS
officers began dissolving rival resistance bands around this time in order to monopolize the
resistance movement. The skirmishes were temporarily halted for roughly four months by the
British-negotiated National Bands Agreement of July 1943, the aim of which, was to ensure that
all resistance forces participate in a joint headquarters in order to coordinate resistance against
the Germans.62
But despite the National Bands Agreement, EAM/ELAS was confident of their popularity
and hold over the resistance movement in Greece and felt the GIE would eventually have no
choice but to include them into a government of national unity; EAM constantly applied pressure
to the government and the British for this aim. The British had enough foresight to bring
representatives of the resistance units, including EAM, to Cairo in August 1943 in order to have
talks with the GIE, headed by Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos at the time. Leading the
visit, was the head of the British military mission to the Greek mountains, Brigadier E.C.
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Meyers. Meyers was aware of both the importance of the issues at hand and the tensions between
the GIE and resistance organizations, and told his superiors to consider that the “future of Greece
may be bound up with [the] forthcoming visit, but we have it in our power to prevent civil
war.”63 The issues at hand were to focus on re-making the GIE cabinet as a coalition which
included the participation of EAM, and also to obtain a statement that the king would not return
to Greece until the issue had been decided by a national plebiscite. But just as the Greek Prime
Minister and his cabinet members were on the verge of agreement to these terms, Churchill,
aware of what was about to happen, cut off the talks and sent EAM representatives back to
Greece. The leaders of EAM were humiliated by such treatment and upon their return looked to
secure their position in Greece.
Historians view this sequence events as a major turning point in British-EAM relations as
it led EAM/ELAS to come to the conclusion that the British intended to eventually impose the
monarch on Greece and that they were intent on disabling leftist resistance groups in favor of
their right-wing rivals.64 After the talks in Cairo failed to comply with the requests of the
resistance groups in Greece, as David Close points out, “The Communist leaders were now
convinced that the British were ready to use ruthless measures to destroy them.” Subsequently,
EAM/ELAS embarked upon a course of disbanding all other resistance groups to ensure their
supremacy in the country. 65
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The first acts of civil war commenced in October 1943 with EAM/ELAS attacking their
rivals; their goal however, was to dissolve EDES bands rather than to rack up high fatalities.
C.M. Woodhouse, the newly installed leader of the British Military Mission wrote on October 19
that the “fighting has been fierce and noisy, but the casualties very small.”66 This phase of
fighting lasted until the British negotiated a ceasefire known as the Plaka Agreement of February
1944, which was intended to cease hostilities, combine resistance forces against the Axis enemy,
and to place all resistance forces under the command of the GIE. In reality, it amounted merely
to a temporary reduction of conflict.67
The British informed the United States of happenings in Greece toward the end of 1943
and informed them of their plans to negotiate the cease-fire. As an Aide-Memoire from the
British Embassy to the U.S. Department of State from December of 1943 shows, British officials
intended to manipulate the information on the Greek situation reaching American officials in
order to keep them in line with British thinking. The document also shows the British
increasingly leaned toward toleration of EAM’s adversaries in order to keep the organization
marginalized in the Greek political sphere. Without any mention whatsoever of EDES’ growing
collaborationist ties in Greece, (a fact known in all British circles at the time), the letter opened
with the statement, “In view of the Civil War started in Greece by the E.A.M-E.L.A.S.” and
provided no earlier context of the situation.68 The purpose of these statements might have been
to persuade its readers against the leftist EAM by assigning blame to them for the civil war. The
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letter informed the Americans of the soon-to-be proposed terms of the Plaka Agreement, and
showed British awareness that they needed to manipulate the situation to one that justified the
support of right-wing resistance bands in order to counter EAM/ELAS.
The British were up-front with the Americans in explaining to them how they might try
to politically maneuver EAM into a corner. They informed the Americans of how they intended
to construct an agreement that would favor the right-wing groups, but leave the appearance of
impartiality. One portion of the letter noted that because of this policy, it would appear that “His
Majesty’s Government will avoid any direct responsibility of taking sides in Greek [internal]
affairs.”69 Nevertheless, British intentions were transparent in taking sides, as were their
anxieties towards appearances. The British plan was to neutralize EAM/ELAS and propose a
plan that was “practically impossible for ELAS to refuse. If ELAS [did] refuse, the help given to
Zervas will be justified to the full, whilst the authority of ELAS leaders will at the same time be
undermined.”70 EAM/ELAS in February 1944 did agree to the above provisions which
eventually formed the Plaka Agreement, but they did not give up control over their armed wing.
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High-Handed British Actions and American Perceptions of Foreign Intervention in Greece
(December 1943 – September 1944)

American intelligence was starting to form its own opinions on the Greek situation in late
1943. The first significant American reports from Greece focused on British and Soviet
involvement in the Greek conflict. In December of 1943, Charles Edson of the OSS Research
and Analysis Branch wrote from Cairo to Washington about British management of the Greek
situation, the exiled Greek government, the two major resistance groups EAM and EDES, and
the likelihood of Soviet involvement in Greek affairs. Regarding Soviet involvement in EAM,
Edson discounted any connection between Greek communists and the Soviet Union as hearsay.
Offering what he called, “An American view of the situation in Greece,” Edson wrote to the
analysis branch on how badly the British had mishandled the Greek situation because of their
tendency to be “empire builders.” Also of concern to Edson was the fact that the right people
were not making the decisions in Greece. Indeed, there were many “informed persons [among
the British] who have an intimate understanding…of the Greek situation…but are in subordinate
positions…and…their views have been disregarded.”71 In relation to a Soviet-Greek connection,
Edson wrote:

71

Charles Edson, OSS Research and Analysis Branch, Cairo to Robert Wolff, Head of Balkan Section OSS
Research and Analysis Branch, Washington. December 11, 1943, “An American View of the situation in Greece,” in
Clogg, Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War, 163-166.

34

I have never seen any real evidence for contact between Russia and the EAM. It is
frequently asserted that such contact exists, but the sources for such assertions either
cannot be established or, if established, turn out to be downright bad and/or highly
suspicious. I have a moral certainty that there is some kind of, probably surreptitious,
contact between Russia and EAM, but as I say, there is no evidence, let alone proof, at
all.72

Edson’s assumption that there was probably some sort of clandestine contact between EAM and
the Soviets was a popular sentiment among the British, but proof of cooperation between EAM
and the Soviets was elusive and discounted by American intelligence.
While at the beginning of 1944 EAM had continued to enjoy popular support for their
resistance activities, the opposite was true for the GIE, whom many in Greece had viewed as
stale and useless. Added to this was the already controversial issue of the return of King George
II to Greece, which most were opposed to, including the Greek armed forces in the Middle East.
As the GIE resided in Cairo, EAM, in control of most of Greece, sought to form an umbrella
organization of groups who actually resided in the country with the intent of forming a national
unity government. This umbrella organization known as The Political Committee of National
Liberation (PEEA) was officially formed in March of 1944 and was an organization located in
Greece’s liberated mountain areas. PEEA enjoyed a great deal of popularity and support as an
alternative to the hapless GIE and its formation was clearly a challenge to its authority.73
The creation of PEEA in Greece however, had far-reaching repercussions. While the GIE
resided in Cairo during the occupation, the British Royal Navy (RN) worked with the Greek

72

Ibid.

73

Close, The Origins, 107.

35

Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) whose fleet had retreated to bases in Egypt along with the Greek
government during the occupation. As word of the creation of PEEA reached Cairo, many who
served in the RHN supported the idea of a government without the British favored monarch, and
the idea of including of other groups into a national unity government of Greece. In April of
1944, a mutiny in Greece’s RHN occurred, which brought old political issues together with
contemporary ones, partly because of the 1916 split between those who favored the monarch and
those who favored the republicans and Prime Minister Venizelos.74 The strife in 1916, as it had
done to most of Greece’s population, divided the RHN into 2 competing factions that pitted
royalists against republicans from that year on, and constant changes in leadership tilted the odds
to favor whichever political entity had power at the time, with both sides purging officers of
different political persuasions.75
In April 1944, Greek crews refused British orders to sail, as Greek naval crews protested
the British and the GIE’s reluctance to form a national unity government based on PEEA.76
Although the GIE had a hard time finding soldiers who would quell the uprising, they eventually
suppressed it without the need for interference of British troops. The mutiny caused 7 deaths and
37 injured, most of which were mutineers. When the British investigated the naval mutiny, it was
discovered that at least 50 percent of all the crews involved in the mutiny supported it, without
pressure.77
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Subsequently, at the insistence of the British, republican and leftist elements of the GIE
were purged from the Greek armed forces, leaving the military of the GIE comprised of a “rightwing royalist complexion.”78 Greek officers with the help of British officers set out on a course
of creating a Greek military that harbored no sympathy towards the left and EAM. The numbers
to this effect are staggering, as out of the 18,500 troops that were in the GIE armed forces, 8000
were arrested and interned by the British for the remainder of the war.79
British attitudes toward the Greek situation could have influenced the American
ambassador to the Greek government in exile Lincoln MacVeagh, who reported inaccurate
information on the mutiny in Greece’s navy during 1944. Although no evidence has ever
surfaced that shows EAM had knowledge of, or influence in causing the naval mutiny,
ambassador MacVeagh commented on the situation on April 14, 1944 by inferring not only that
EAM had a hand in the mutiny, but also that possibly the Russians were interested in it.
MacVeagh wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State on how GIE officials viewed the events:

Russian interest in the movement, as tending in general to swing the government of
Greece to the left, and in particular to bring EAM more powerfully into the picture, is
now widely recognized in Greek circles here, owing to the sympathetic attitude of the
Soviet Ambassador and the propaganda activities of the Moscow press and radio and is
causing some speculation as to how far it will go and whether Russia now aspires to
supplant Britain as the dominating foreign power in connection with Greek affairs.80
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A few days later, a memorandum from Paul Alling, the U.S. Deputy Director of the Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Secretary of State reiterated MacVeagh’s sentiments that
the Russians had some sort of interest or involvement in the RHN mutiny. The insinuation of
Soviet involvement went a step further when ambassador MacVeagh reported again to the
Secretary of State on April 19, that in his conversation with the British commander Reginald
Leeper, the commander had suggested that the Soviets had helped instigate the mutiny, and could
stop it at any time. MacVeagh reported that Leeper had told him that the Russian influence in the
affair was “outrageous” and that “The Russians could stop the trouble in a minute if they would.”
In the same letter, MacVeagh wrote of how Leeper assumed that Soviet policy elsewhere in
Europe and the Middle East had a connection with the mutinous events in Cairo. MacVeagh
wrote:

Further, as regards the Russian angle, my colleague expressed the idea that the extent to
which Soviet support is being given to this movement suggests a connection with Soviet
policies elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East which would appear out of keeping
with the spirit of Tehran.81

This correspondence, although not based on American intelligence, represents a case
where British assertions could have influenced American ideas about the Greek situation,
American perceptions of the role of EAM in the Greek naval mutiny, and the Soviet role in both.
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MacVeagh relayed more imprecise information to the U.S. State Department on April 20, 1944.
Reporting on a conversation with new interim Prime Minister of Greece Georgios Papandreou,
MacVeagh recalled that Papandreou seemed to validate Leeper’s feelings on the tie between the
Soviet Union and EAM. MacVeagh wrote that Papandreou had told him that the “EAM has
become an instrument for the spreading of the Soviet influence in opposition to the hitherto
dominant British throughout this region thus threatening Greece with possible further martyrdom
as the crossroads of the powers.”82
Reporting on the Russian response to the situation, MacVeagh tended to be very skeptical
of the veracity of Russian assertions. Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyachislav Molotov,
professed ignorance of the situation of Greece’s naval mutiny, however, MacVeagh dismissed
this statement when on May 1, 1944 he wrote to the Secretary of State that
“[Molotov’s]…profession of ignorance re Greek affairs is similar to Mr. Molotov’s statements of
last winter which are even harder to believe now than they were then.”83 While MacVeagh
showed skepticism that the Russians were ignorant of Greek affairs, he did not, however, show a
tendency to either validate or deny the claims of Russian involvement in the mutinies.
After the naval mutiny in Egypt, it was clear that many Greeks desired a government that
incorporated not only a wider political demographic, but one that included the representatives of
the highly popular EAM. The British and Papandreou realized that any Greek coalition
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government needed to include representatives of the left to be considered legitimate to Greece’s
population and decided to consider including EAM specifically. In May of 1944, under the
chairmanship of Greece’s newly installed Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, a conference in
Lebanon was convened by representatives of Greece’s many political parties in order to hash out
an agreement on a government of national unity, with the added intention of bringing ELAS
under the military control of the British and the GIE.84 For a moment, the agreement looked like
a success and promised at least the prospect of peace. Although the “Lebanon Charter” was short
lived, EAM was incorporated into this government of 24 ministers, 6 of whom were members of
the political resistance group.85
Since EAM’s representatives at the Lebanon Conference were unable to correspond with
their counterparts back in Greece (thanks to British interference), they conceded to the Lebanon
Charter without the consultation of their members back in Greece. The “National Contract”
conceived of by Papandreou and the British was to effectively put all resistance forces under the
control of the GIE and British field General Ronald Scobie. However, the charter also succeeded
in securing the promise from the king that he would not return until after a plebiscite. EAM’s
leaders back in Greece viewed the contract as a too favorable towards the GIE, and immediately
refused to accept its terms. In the next few months however, EAM’s leaders in Greece did an
about-face and agreed to join the Papandreou coalition in July 1944 after likely Soviet pressure
to do so. After a Soviet Military Mission to Greece visited EAM/ELAS headquarters in late July
1946 – the first known contact between the Soviets and EAM/ELAS - the latter developed more
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cordial attitudes toward the GIE, and decided to join it. In all likelihood, the Soviet mission
probably directed EAM to join the Papandreou government so as to keep in accordance with an
agreement being worked out between the British and Soviets on spheres of influence.86 EAM
joined the Papandreou government in September 1944 under the Caserta Agreement, which
defined the resistance army’s zones of control and formally placed all ELAS troops under the
command of British General Ronald Scobie. But the fact that German withdrawal was in sight
foreshadowed a new conflict on the horizon for the Greeks.

Churchill lobbies Roosevelt (April 1944 – June 1944)

Up until mid - 1944, the Americans were mostly concerned that the British were
asserting their imperial aspirations and mismanaging Greece, especially when Winston Churchill
and Joseph Stalin spoke of creating spheres of influence, which the U.S. State Department and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had firmly opposed. Prior to the percentages agreement made by
Stalin and Churchill at the Moscow conference in October 1944, the State Department and
Roosevelt suspected that Britain and the Soviets were already on this path.
In a series of telegrams to Roosevelt and the U.S. Department of State, Churchill made
emotional appeals to get the U.S. on the same page as both he and Stalin regarding their plans for
carving up Eastern Europe. At the end of May 1944, Churchill wrote Roosevelt asking if the U.S.
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would “give this proposal [their] blessing.”87 On June 10th, acting Secretary of State E.R.
Stettinius, skeptical of British plans, wrote to FDR that, “However adroitly the proposed
arrangement [between the Soviets and the British] is presented, it seems to really amount to the
establishment of spheres of influence, and an attempt to obtain American approval of such a
policy.”88 President Roosevelt, vehemently against the idea of partitioning Eastern Europe
initially rejected such an approval. On June 12, the Department of State wrote to the British
Embassy on U.S. objections to such a plan:

The Department firmly believes that the practical and military advantages sought in
resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a
system. It is consequently unwilling to give the approval of this government to the
proposed arrangement.89

But Churchill was persistent with the president. Knowing full well that Stalin had no
immediate intentions on Greece, specifically because on May 18, 1944, the Soviet ambassador
had agreed that the Soviets should “take the lead in Romanian affairs, while we [the British]
should take the lead in Greek affairs,” Churchill once again used his political cunning in order to
make the situation seem dire. Citing no evidence, Churchill wrote to FDR on June 23rd that, if
nothing were to be done, the already unpopular king “would be forced to abdicate, and EAM
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would work a reign of terror in Greece, forcing villagers and many other classes to form security
battalions under German auspices to prevent utter anarchy.” Churchill then went a step further to
insinuate knowledge that the Greek communists were bolstered by the Soviets. “The only way I
can prevent this,” he wrote, “is by persuading the Russians to quit boosting EAM and ramming it
forward with all their force.”90 Churchill eventually convinced the President to go along with the
“spheres of influence”, the latter being under the impression that the agreement would be
temporary measure.91 The back and forth between Churchill and Roosevelt was likely a very
influential factor in determining early views in Washington of EAM, the KKE, and Soviet
involvement, but those views failed to elicit any concerned response by American policymakers.

British Options for EAM Counterweight and the Americans Perception of the Situation (May
1944 – September 1944).

By the last quarter of 1944, it was clear that German withdrawal from Greece was on the
horizon. Rather than coming together and creating a unified government, however, both
EAM/ELAS and EDES seemingly concluded that fighting the Germans was an unnecessary
waste of resources. The deep mistrust of both groups toward each other inevitably ensured that
hostilities would resume upon Axis withdrawal. Adjacent to this was Churchill’s stubborn desire
to re-install the Greek king at any cost. To combat the possibility that EAM might take control in

90

Churchill to Roosevelt, 23 June 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: 126.

91

Clogg, Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War, 14.

43

the power vacuum left by the retreating Germans, the British went so far as to consider
incorporating the Greek Security Battalions - a collaborationist force created by the Germans
under General Ioannis Rallis - into the new Greek armed forces in order to keep a pro-British,
non-communist government in Greece. The prospect of siding with quisling Greeks, who were in
essence “doing the work of the Germans” was not an easy decision for British policy-makers, but
because of their fears of EAM power and a firm determination keep EAM from influencing the
Greek government, they likely felt it was their only option. In any case, it became clear that as
far as Churchill was concerned, the Greeks who collaborated with the Nazi occupiers were
preferable to communist-influenced resisters.92
After EAM had repudiated the Lebanon charter in May of 1944, but before their
subsequent agreement to join the Papandreou government, the British contemplated breaking ties
with EAM/ELAS and denouncing them publicly. But the new head of the British Military
Mission in Greece, General C.M. Woodhouse advised Churchill and Eden against doing either.
On June 21st, Woodhouse explained that if a break with EAM/ELAS were to occur, the British
would have to rely on the Security Battalions in Greece; a prospect that would not help make the
British or the GIE popular in Greece or in public opinion abroad. Until the matter was decided
though, Woodhouse argued that the door should be left open to the security battalions.93 In April
of 1944, Woodhouse’s subordinate and next in command, Tom Barnes presented his judgment
on the situation and suggested to his superiors in Cairo that he “[felt] certain that they [the
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Security Battalions] [would] be wholeheartedly on the side of any Allied invasion force.”94 This
assertion is astonishing considering that the Security Battalions were the creation of the Germans
and the quisling Greek government during the German occupation, and that Greece was still in
the midst of that occupation. Barnes proposed to tread carefully and act with discernment:

Hence, although they are admittedly doing the work of the Germans, I think we should
avoid publically denouncing them in such terms that the way to later reconciliation is
irrevocably closed. There are good and bad among these Rallis battalions.95

This predicament the British found themselves in was evident in the Political Intelligence
Paper dated June 18, 1944 from British Deputy Director of Military Intelligence Captain D.
Barrett to the Foreign Office. The paper accentuated the British dilemma in confronting EAM
and the Security Battalions, and presented several options and their possible consequences.
Transparent in the document was the British determination to leave no option off the table:
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1. Britain could encourage the state of equilibrium between EAM/ELAS and the Security
Battalions, (which the report concluded would result in the continuation of the "bitter
feud)."
2. Britain could give full support to EAM/ELAS and denounce the battalions. (The report
concluded that this policy would probably result in a short-lived left dictatorship).
3. Britain could "countenance, though tacitly, the Security Battalions and denounce
EAM/ELAS as a terroristic minority" which was unwilling to cooperate with the Allies.
(This option, the report surmised, would win support inside Greece, but it would "alienate
large sections of the international community").
4. Britain could denounce the Security Battalions and the “extremists" of EAM/ELAS,
“whose actions enabled the Battalions to be formed." This policy, according to the report,
offered the "best prospects" of drawing off the moderates from both sides into a national
army.96

Some in the U.S. were also willing to consider the support of collaborating units inside
Greece as early as April 1944. Intelligence officer Moses Hadad wrote to the head of the
Research and Analysis branch of the OSS that the right-wing Security Battalions had become
“too weighty a weapon to be disposed of simply because they were creations of the Germans”
showing an early willingness for tolerating the extreme Greek right-wing militias who since
March, had accompanied German troops in frequently raiding EAM districts in the Athens
area.97
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The Caserta Agreement of September 26, 1944 which brought EAM into the GIE gave
some hope that the British, the GIE, and the Greek Left could cooperate. This short-lived
agreement signed by the British, EAM, and EDES put all resistance groups in Greece under the
command of British General Ronald Scobie and prohibited any resistance activity in Athens
without specific orders from the British general; it also temporarily characterized the Security
Battalions as enemy units. However, members of the quisling Security Battalions would be
called upon by the British later on in 1944 and into 1945 as events came to a head in Athens
upon German withdrawal.
The Americans, although not involved at this point, were doubtlessly keeping an eye on
the situation through their diplomatic presence. Lincoln MacVeagh’s diary entry on September
27th shows that the American intelligence and diplomatic presence was fully aware of the
broader intricacies of British involvement in the Greece situation, and the significance of that
involvement. MacVeagh wrote that “the British operational and liaison groups with which ours
collaborate are actively engaged in promoting EDES against ELAS and thus participating to a
certain degree in Greek internal strife.” MacVeagh also made the astute observation that since
the American officials were amongst the British, they too may be seen by the Greeks as involved
in supporting ELAS’ enemies, and he wrote that American officials, “must inevitably be
regarded by the Greeks as involved so long as they remain[ed] with their British counterparts.”
In the same entry, MacVeagh’s written thoughts are transparent regarding his view of British
treatment of EAM/ELAS. MacVeagh spoke about rumors that General Scobie had ordered
ELAS to keep out of Athens - where the British intended to make their entrance into Greece –
and about the response from ELAS that British troops were not needed; MacVeagh wrote that
47

ELAS’ response was “not unnatural, really, since the British have done so little for the Greeks to
date, and are now only coming in after the German pull out!” 98 MacVeagh’s insights on the
Greek situation (with a few exceptions) joined with U.S. intelligence reports to provide the upper
echelons of government a relatively clear picture of the Greek crisis.

German Withdrawal and the Defeat of EAM/ELAS: British Actions and American Reporting
(September 1944 – February 1945)

A major point of contention among early historians of the Greek civil war was the issue
of the intentions of EAM and the Greek communists upon liberation from the occupation in
October 1944. While the traditional view held that the Greek communists in EAM aimed at an
armed seizure of power in December, revisionists claimed that this was not the case because no
force inside the country could have stopped EAM from taking power upon German withdrawal
in October.99 When the GIE entered Greece on October 18 1944, all vital services of the country
were controlled by EAM, and in most towns and villages, EAM was essentially the real
authority.100 But EAM did not attempt to take over the government in Athens between the
October withdrawal and December 1944. This fact remains a central point in revisionist and
post-revisionist interpretations of EAM intentions during the early part of the civil war.

98

Lincoln MacVeagh Diary Entry, September 27, 1944 in John O. Iatrides, ed., Ambassador MacVeagh Reports:
Greece, 1933-1947 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 609.
99

This argument holds a dominating place in the revisionist case.

100

Close, The Origins, 127, 129.

48

However, armed conflict between EAM, the government forces and the British did occur in early
December and lasted until the end of the month. The British stepped up their actions with a
sustained campaign against the communists in December, and continued to encourage right-wing
groups that vied for their position in the new Greek government, it’s police, and its armed forces.
The Germans started their withdrawal from Greece in September 1944 in order to avoid
being trapped in the Balkan peninsula by the advancing Soviet army who occupied the northern
part of it. The last Germans left Greece by October 14. After the Caserta Agreement in late
September 1944, despite their requests that the British troops were not needed in Greece, EAM
had resigned to the fact that the liberation of Athens would take place under British terms, and
subsequently British troops entered Athens on October 15, 1944.101 King George began to press
the British to assure his return to Athens. But the British were aware that a return of the king to
such a precarious situation so soon after liberation could only raise tensions, and Churchill told
the King on October 4 that he could not return until he was called to do so by the new Greek
government in Athens. Churchill was by no means reneging on the British promise to return the
king to Greece. To the contrary, he most likely wanted to make sure that EAM/ELAS
propaganda could not make the claim that the British were imposing the king upon them.102 Two
days later, Churchill cabled Eden that he “certainly had proposed to tell Papandreou that, as soon
as he gets established, it is his duty to bring the king back, and that we should certainly use our
influence to that end.”103
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The Papandreou cabinet along with General Leeper entered Athens on October 18, 1944
to find Greece in a state of economic collapse due mostly to destruction wreaked by the Axis
occupiers. His next objective was to obtain the demobilization of ELAS units in order to strip the
Greek communists of their ability to dominate Greek society and politics. Papandreou entered
into negotiations with KKE party Chairman at the time, George Siantos, with the hope of
disbanding ELAS units. However, negotiations were stalled due to the insistence of Papandreou
and the British that the well-known extreme right-wing Mountain Brigades – trained by the
British from the remaining armed forces in exile after the April naval mutiny was quelled – be
held intact and enter Greece as part of the new armed forces. General Leeper recognized that this
might be a point of contention when he commented to the Foreign Office that members of the
Mountain Brigades were as extreme in the political views as were the communists. However, he
added that he was confident that they could be restrained by British General Ronald Scobie.104
But Papandreou initially turned a deaf ear to Siantos’ request that the Mountain Brigades
stay out of the capital, and with General Scobie’s consent, made plans for them to enter Athens
in early November 1944. Most likely, EAM’s suspicions of British intents were in their view
coming to fruition, as on November 8, 1944, the Mountain Brigades indeed entered Athens. The
communists feared that the use of these units again foreshadowed the British installation of the
Greek monarch and the second coming of the events of the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936. Even
some British officers could see these events as needlessly provoking tensions. British officer
C.M. Woodhouse advised against bringing in the Mountain Brigades, seeing it as “the most
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important single factor contributory to the loss of faith by EAM/ELAS.”105 The communists
argued that if ELAS bands had to disband, then so too should the royalist units, who would
surely be a threat to anyone with leftist sympathies.
After the arrival of the Mountain Brigades in Athens, it seems as if Papandreou suddenly
came to understand the severity of the crisis, and in negotiations with the KKE agreed that if
ELAS bands would demobilize, the Mountain Brigades would be sent on leave, implying that
they were to eventually be disbanded as well. However, Papandreou had to go back on his word,
as objections from the British forced his hand; the Mountain Brigades were to remain intact in
Greece.106 Also a point of contention and suspicion for EAM and anyone on the left, was the
make-up of a new National Guard which was mobilized on November 24. Upon their
mobilization, the Greek Ministry of Defense posted a public list of the officers serving their
ranks. Eight of the fourteen battalion commanders had been participants of the German created
Security Battalions.107 Although Papandreou had attempted to reconcile his position with the
communists and the right-wing groups in Greece, the British forced his hand and browbeat him
to side politically with the far-right, thus alienating him from the communists and even the
moderate left.108
After these events, the communist members of the recently formed coalition government
resigned and on December 2, started plans for demonstrations, and a general strike on December
4. The mass demonstrations in Syntagma Square in Athens’ center, which had been rumored to
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happen, were forbidden by the Papandreou cabinet, but took place nonetheless.109 As thousands
of EAM protestors marched on Syntagma Square on December 3, 1944, a panicked policeman
opened fire on the crowd and his colleagues joined in, killing at least 16 people and injuring
60.110 Fighting on the streets of Athens broke out and became fierce once the British joined in
on December 6. By now, the British were imposing their will on the main resistance group of an
Allied country not only by their political maneuvering, but also by force.
The ELAS was initially hesitant to use force on the British soldiers, partly because in
September 1944 they had agreed to be placed under British command in Greece, and partly
because of their understanding that Stalin would not back an armed struggle. But ELAS troops
took orders from their officers to capture and occupy all police stations in Athens, eventually
successfully taking 19 out of 24. This was especially significant since the capture of arms from
these positions allowed ELAS to increase its number of armed soldiers from 6,000 to 12,000 in
Athens. The arrival of ELAS troops from outside the city had by December 7, 1944 raised the
numbers of armed ELAS combatants to about 22,000, compared to only about 10,500 Greek
anti-communist forces.111 But ELAS’ requests for support from the Russians – through
Bulgarian communist channels - went unanswered, and British reinforcements to the tune of
75,000 soldiers in Greece by January 1945 greatly outnumbered ELAS. Combined with
supplemental Greek National Guard Troops with numbers up to 23,000 (12,000 of which were
former collaborationist troops whom the decision to arm was the British’s), these were fatal
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prospects for EAM/ELAS and the communists.112 Hence, it was now the British who supplanted
the Germans as the leaders of anti-communists in Greece.
The Americans were not in the dark on the December 1944 events in Greece. U.S.
ambassador MacVeagh was up to date and aware of British actions and intentions during the
“Dekemvriana” as those December events were subsequently dubbed. On December 8, 1944,
MacVeagh astutely described the situation in a few words. According to him, this was not a
simple conflict of two extremes, but it was much more complicated. The ambassador wrote that
“many thousands of patriotic Greeks…[that were] siding with [the] extreme Left [were]
undoubtedly doing so because they suspect[ed] that behind the governments actions [layed] an
intention to bring back the king and possibly also the hated fascist dictatorship for which they
[held] him personally responsible.” MacVeagh also conversely noted that many other patriotic
Greeks were equally afraid that the communists were intending to “impose a communist
dictatorship” and that “General Scobie [was] concentrating troops including the Greek Mountain
Brigade in the center of Athens.” The same day he remarked that he and his British colleague
were aware that the British were instigating the fighting by erroneously supporting one side,
which, he opined, could only lead to further complications in Greece:
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I feel certain that the present drastic foreign support being given to one side of local
Greek quarrel in which so much genuine patriotic fervor and even fanaticism is enlisted
in the other contains little if any hope of furnishing a durable solution unless it can be
followed by some such clear proof of genuine impartial interest in the Greek people as a
whole. 113

The ambassador’s reports were summarized in a memorandum by the Secretary of State
to Roosevelt on the developments in Greece. The President took them seriously enough to cable
Churchill the next day with suggestions that might help diffuse the situation. Roosevelt
recommended another statement from the king that he would not return until called on to do so,
and suggested that the Greeks establish a temporary regency that represented the king until the
issue of his return could be decided. Additionally, Roosevelt told Churchill that it might be wise
to create an agreement to disarm and disband the Mountain Brigades and the famous “Sacred
Bands” who were trained by the British and fought with them in the Italian and African
campaigns.114 On December 17, 1944 Churchill cabled back to the President that the king would
not agree to the appointment of a regent, and again made an emotional appeal to the President
that the “disarmament of the Mountain Brigades who took Rimini and Sacred Squadron who had
fought so well at the side of the British and American troops would seriously weaken our forces
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and in any case we could not abandon them to massacre.”115 Churchill subsequently flew to
Athens to get a firsthand look at the Greek situation. After seeing the political squabbling and
lack of support for the king firsthand, he finally heeded Roosevelt’s advice to consider the
appointment of a regency, and was able to convince the king to consent to the appointment of
Archbishop Damaskinos as regent in the king’s absence. But on the subject of the dissolution of
the Mountain Brigades, Churchill was silent.116
Having lost their position of strength in the capital once British reinforcements arrived,
enormously outnumbered, and outclassed militarily, ELAS troops began to withdraw from the
capital on January 5,, 1945.117 After a month of fighting, peace returned to Athens. A new
government was formed on January 3, 1945 with General Nikolas Plastiras, a retired Venizelist
republican General as the new Prime Minister. Plastiras immediately made it clear that EAM’s
time for negotiating their way into a coalition was over, as were ELAS’ requests for integration
into a national army. Plastiras’ view was that “the situation could be put right only by force.”118
The new government was formed at the insistence of the British with no representation from
EAM.
The Varkiza Agreement concluded between EAM and the British on February 15, 1945
had ended the hostilities for the moment with promises from ELAS to disband, and promises by
the Greek government to grant amnesty to those who laid down their arms, to build a democracy,

115

Churchill to Roosevelt, 17 December 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: 159-160.

116

Sfikas, “The people at the Top,” 322.

117

Also important to note is the response of the Soviets during December, when Stalin appointed his ambassador to
the Greek government while ELAS units were fighting in Athens. This must have been a major disappointment to
the Greek communists.
118

Quoted in Sfikas, “The People at the Top,” 323.

55

and to restore civil liberties in Greece. But Churchill, determined to break the power of the left,
was not satisfied with the terms of the truce. His physician reported later that Churchill thought
that the agreement “was a mistake” and that the British “ought to teach the communists a
lesson.”119
Prior to the Soviet’s triumph at Stalingrad in January 1943, the intents and actions of the
British were to fan the flames of armed resistance against the Axis occupiers in Greece and to
support the GIE. Once the Stalingrad victories virtually assured Allied victory, the British
objective was to prevent Greece from falling into the hands of the Greek communists, and thus
into Soviet hands; to the British, this seemed to be the direction the country was headed if left to
its own devices. Stalin’s promise to Churchill in October 1944 to keep Russian hands off of
Greece was not enough for Churchill, despite the fact that the former had kept to the deal with
strict perfection, and thus the British stepped up their campaign against their former allies. The
Americans had stayed mostly out of British business in Greece, but were adequately aware of the
situation there, the extent of British involvement, and the lack of a Soviet presence or
interference in Greece. Reports and correspondence by the British attempted to persuade
Americans that the Soviets were playing a role in the budding Greek crisis, but the Americans
did not seem too concerned about it. However, by December 1944, the time of simply surveying
the Greek situation was about over for the Americans. From 1945 on, the United States became
increasingly interested in Greece’s domestic conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE: BRITISH TOLERATION OF THE RIGHT,
POLITICAL INTERVENTION, AND AMERICAN ANALYSIS,
FEBRUARY 1945 – MARCH 1946

Although EAM/ELAS’ defeat in Athens strengthened the hold of the British and the
Greek right in the capital, a political battle still lurked in the future for Athens and the whole of
Greece. Astoundingly, in the span of approximately one month, the Greek communists found
themselves in a position of weakness, with little choice but to concede to the demands of the new
government and the British – something few could have foreseen, considering the previous
strength and popularity of EAM/ELAS throughout the country. Indeed, their fall was swift. The
Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945 signed by the Greek government and EAM/ELAS’s
leaders officially ended the December events. The treaty was intended to reconcile the positions
of the extremes of both the left and right by affording amnesty to those in ELAS who would lay
down their weapons, and to prepare the country for a plebiscite to be followed by general
elections. It’s initiatives failed almost from the beginning as few Greeks on the right were
inclined to reconcile with the Greek left which they ultimately equated to Greek communism.
Just one week after having concluded peace terms that accorded amnesty for ELAS
guerillas who would lay down their weapons, police in the capital had jailed over 4,000 people
labeled as left-wing sympathizers, foreshadowing developments for the rest of 1945 and into
1946. Although the British were the only force in the country that could feasibly restrain the
country’s far swing to the right, they did virtually nothing to prevent it; the British had virtually
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chosen, trained, financed, and equipped much of the Greek armed forces, police, and
gendarmerie by the end of 1945.120
From the start of 1945 until March of 1946, the Greek government underwent several
changes at the insistence of the British. They hoped that by creating a stable government loyal to
British interests, this would block perceived communist encroachment from the Soviets. To the
British, blocking the Soviets from Greece started with blocking leftist access to representative
power there. If all went according to plan, it would allow the British to successfully withdraw
from Greece amid questions from a skeptical public in England that questioned British objectives
there.121 But the British were seemingly unable to change the outcome of rightist violence
against the left, even if they had tremendous influence on who headed the government. This
failure led to a highly unstable situation in Greece.
From April of 1944 to April of 1945 four men held the position as Prime Minister in the
Greek government, some bringing with them new cabinet members, with varying credentials and
political leanings. But essentially, there were two competing factions of right-wing extremism in
Greece during and after World War II. Indeed, the Populists (those who supported the monarch),
and the right-wing factions of the republicans were not aligned, but competed not so much over
who could lead the country, but rather, who could better apply reaction to and vendetta against
the left. To their credit, the British were concerned that a return to the days of a right-wing
dictatorship would bring about just as much instability as would a communist dictatorship of the
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left. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the “White Terror” – the period between February 1945
and March 1946 when various Greek institutions (the police, gendarmerie, Army, and National
Guard) capitalized on their power and pursued a vendetta against the left – was made possible
only by the backing of the British.122

British Toleration, MacVeagh’s Preconceptions, and American Views of Early Post-Occupation
Greek Governments.

From late December 1944 to the beginning of January 1945, the Greek political
landscape was realigned at the hands of the British. From this point, the British worked with the
Greek government to ensure that there would be no more negotiations that would allow EAM to
access any influence in government, nor would there be any further talk of incorporating ELAS
units into a national military; for the next two years, the force directing successive Greek
governments was for all intents and purposes the British Embassy and the Foreign Office.123
While the British hoped stability would return and EAM’s influence would decline, they also
hoped Plastiras would contain the expected reaction against EAM from the anti-communist
army, police, National Guard, and right-wing thug groups.124 Their hopes were nowhere close to
being realized.
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While Papandreou’s failure to unite Greece’s political parties before the Dekemvriana
stemmed from his desire to please the extremes, the same could not be said about his successor,
General Plastiras. A subscriber of, and hero to the republican right, Plastiras was more concerned
with punishing the left than fixing Greece’s vast array of problems of rebuilding infrastructure,
fixing the economy, or any other in the aftermath of the near total destruction of the state from
Axis occupation. Under General Plastiras’ ministry, violent excesses against the left became
commonplace, as hooligans from the old Security Battalions threatened anyone with leftist
sympathies in Athens, while trials of collaborators were endlessly postponed and many times
even forgotten about. The police, too, were harassing and arresting anyone associated with the
former resistance.125 Under Plastiras’ direction, there existed a fierce passion against
communism in the Army and police. Ethnikophron officers – most with Metaxist backgrounds –
made up 5 out of 8 of the General Staff of the army; 10 out of 13 military governors had held
important posts under Metaxas; only 7 out of 56 colonels were made up of moderates.126 Added
to this was the problem of the distribution of crucially needed relief supplies that in the hands of
the Greek government became political weapons.127
Adjacently, the British, with no apparent inclination or foresight as to how this would be
perceived, opposed any attempts by government officials to appoint anyone without an
Ethnikophron background to the leadership of the armed forces, quite possibly because the
British had fought alongside Ethnikophron members of the Greek Mountain Brigades in Italy,
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the Aegean, and the Middle East during the Greek government’s time in exile. Former members
of the Security Battalions and collaborators were now also numerous in the officer corps. The
reformation of the National Guard took place in large part with British meddling, excluded
anyone with left-leaning sympathies, and like the officer corps, included former members of the
Security Battalions. 128
The Americans were sufficiently aware of the new government’s trending to the right.
Alexander Kirk, the political advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean
informed the U.S. Secretary of State on March 8, 1945 of his concern that the Greek Government
was taking on a diabolical life of its own. Kirk told the Secretary of State that British Minister
Resident in the Mediterranean, Harold Macmillan, had informed him that the situation in Greece,
“was not going so well. He said [the] Plastiras government… [was]… veering more and more to
the Right and that he [Macmillan] had to ‘crack them on the head’.”129
Ambassador MacVeagh was also aware that the extreme right under the direction of
government forces was in the midst of a reaction against the left. On March 10, 1945, MacVeagh
visited with a leading member of EAM who protested the recent and plentiful violations of the
Varkiza agreement by the Greek government, and in their conversation, he responded to the
EAM representative that “violence must be expected as the result of violence” in what amounted
to the Ambassador’s justification of the violations. MacVeagh’s prejudices toward the Greek left
were apparent in his assertion to the Secretary of State that, “officials civil and military are
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human and retaliation for ELAS is unquestionably widespread,” offering further justification for
rightist vengeance.130
Charles Edson of the O.S.S., showing more uneasiness with the situation in Greece than
MacVeagh had, commented on the expansion of right-wing violence, the lack of punishment for
collaborators, and the consequences of both on March 29, 1945. Edson wrote to MacVeagh that:

It [is] quite clear that the present activities of the Greek Right, as well as the failure of the
Government to press charges against quislings and collaborationists, have given the
Communists and Leftists generally plenty of ammunition…[T]he intransigent attitude of
the Right has enabled Greek Leftists to regain, or begin to regain, support which they
otherwise would have lost irretrievably and has enormously complicated the British effort
to bring internal peace and security to Greece.131

As the British were becoming aware that their interference in their formation of the
government and its armed units was escalating the situation, it also became clear to them that
Plastiras could not be the statesman to lead a reconciliation of Greek politics. As early as March
1945, the British informed U.S. Ambassador John Winant in the U.K that they were exploring
the possibility of replacing Plastiras because, “It is evident that Plastiras is not capable of running
a conciliatory government” because “His temperament [was] not suited to such a course.”132 A
week after MacVeagh informed the Secretary of State of new complaints of Varkiza violations,
Kirk wrote to the Secretary of State on March 22 that, “Macmillan informed us today that he
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was somewhat exasperated with the Greek situation” because the British were “constantly
obliged to step in to see to it that the Greek Government kept their side of the Varkiza
Agreement.” Kirk continued that “a wave of reaction was sweeping [the] country and now that
the Right felt the Government was firmly installed with British backing they were out for
revenge.”133 General Leeper had understood the effects of British policy in Greece earlier, and
had suggested as early as February 22,, 1945 that the Foreign Office allow him the right of
intervention to put a stop to Plastiras’ excesses, which would not only help the situation in
Greece, but also help with perceptions back in England. Leeper claimed that if Plastiras would be
allowed to continue on:

we British…will be accused both by the opposition in Greece…and by public opinion in
England of having secured the disarmament of one party in order to allow another party
no more widely representative of public opinion to dominate the country. It was not for
this that British soldiers gave their lives in recent fighting.134

Both Macmillan and Leeper petitioned the Foreign Office to allow them to pressure
Plastiras to sign a treaty that would force him to make every decision contingent on British
approval. Thus, they surmised, he would have no choice but to govern impartially. But the
Foreign Office was worried about the bigger picture and relations with the Soviets, and felt that
outright intervention by the British might set a perilous precedent that would allow the Soviet
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Union to do the same in Eastern Europe.135 Therefore, if the British interfered it would have to
be discreet. Thus, direct intervention by Leeper to quell rightist violence was refused by the
Foreign Office. Nevertheless, Plastiras’ own actions inevitably led to his downfall; his inability
to curb right-wing violence, his excesses, and his tendency to appoint his friends to government
positions regardless of their qualifications ended up being the tools which destroyed his
credibility in the eyes of parties not aligned with the Greek right.
When Petros Voulgaris was installed as Prime Minister of Greece on April 8, 1945, many
in the Royalist camp were initially ecstatic at the appointment since his past suggested an
undying loyalty to the monarch. In April 1944 Voulgaris, as part of the GIE armed forces, helped
to quell the April armed forces mutinies, so it was assumed that his premiership would greatly
favor the Populists. But to their disappointment Voulgaris appointed mostly moderate ministers
to his cabinet. The Populists expected Voulgaris to appoint a government brimming with
Royalists. However, upon taking office, he pledged to work to restore power to the people by
organizing elections and the plebiscite to decide the people’s will and the fate of the monarch.136
Despite Voulgaris’ stated objectives, the White Terror quickly degenerated into a full-fledged
purge of leftists from Greek society. Realizing the country was on the verge of civil war, the
Foreign Office tried to curb the violence before it exploded. Less than two weeks after Voulgaris
took office on April 19, 1945, Leeper was instructed by the Under-Secretary of State Foreign
Affairs Sir Orme Sargent to make absolutely clear that:
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…assistance to the enemy [by those who collaborated with Nazis] [was] regarded by
HM’s government as much worse than membership of EAM”…[and that he was]… by
no means satisfied that adequate purge of gendarmerie and other state services [from
collaborators] has been carried out or is being seriously undertaken.137

Churchill, obsessed with Greece, read the Foreign Office correspondence from Sargent to
Leeper and questioned Sargent’s comments in a subsequent letter, thus showcasing his
dominating personality in Greek affairs and his preference for the Greek collaborators. Replying
to Sargent regarding his instructions to Leeper, Churchill’s reply on April 22, 1945 highlighted
his one-sided views towards Greek politics. Churchill told Sargent:

I do not agree at all...It seems to me that the collaborators in Greece in many cases did the
best they could to shelter the Greek population from German oppression. Anyhow they
did nothing to stop the entry of liberating forces, nor did they give any support to the
EAM designs. The Communists are the main foe, though the punishment of notorious
pro-German collaborators, especially if concerned with the betrayal of loyal Greeks,
should proceed in a regular and strict manner. There should be no question of increasing
the severities against the collaborationists in order to win Communist approval. Their
approval is not worth having138

Some members of the Foreign Office, were shocked by Churchill’s disclosure. William Hayter
remarked on April 23rd 1945, “I should have thought it self-evident that collaboration with
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Germany was a worse crime than Communism, even in Greece. It seems to me rather foolish if
we suggested the contrary…”139
By July 1945, the White Terror was perpetrated by what amounted to an unsanctioned
informal alliance of right-wing armed gangs, the police, the gendarmerie, the National Guard,
and the Army. The “Shadow State” as it became labeled, was the vessel by which all these
groups were able to sustain the violence and persecution against left-leaning citizens in order to
prepare the country for the return of the monarch through a rigged plebiscite.140 Although there
was apparently no formal link between Greek political elites and the rightist violence, Charles
Edson wrote to MacVeagh on July 4, 1945 that “It is reliably reported that important members of
the Greek General Staff are closely connected with the directing of this [White Terror]
movement” while also noting that “a very high degree of [British] selection [was] being
exercised in the recruiting of personnel for the Greek armed forces, the National Guard, the
Gendarmerie and the police.” Putting the onus partly on the British for rightist violence, Edson
asserted that:
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Clearly, the British are very well aware of what is going on, but they either do not
choose, or are unable to exercise any pressure on the Greek government or on rightist
circles which can put an end to the present conspiracy…Only the presence of British
troops in Greece makes the existing rightists political conspiracy possible, and therefore
the British cannot escape some responsibility for this conspiracy…By her acquiescence
in, or toleration of…[it]…Britain is gratuitously presenting…[the Soviets]…most
effective propaganda material…[that]…can be largely based on fact.141

Adding to the severity of the situation was the prospect of elections in Britain set for July
1945. The Greek Populists’ feared that a victory for the British Labor Party would spell the end
of the return of the king because of their assumption that the Labor government in England
would not likely support a monarch. This seemingly set into motion a new wave of terror by the
royalist right in June of 1945. Now, the monarchist National Guard began to distribute
contraband to civilians who were of extreme right-wing persuasion. Rumors caused the fear that
the Populists were planning for a coup d’état to restore the king, and by this time, confidence in
Voulgaris’ ability to quell rightist terror was scant in British circles. British threats to imprison
for life anyone who bore illegal weapons, and further claims that the British would quell a
rightist coup eventually calmed the situation, but Greece was still politically divided as ever. 142
What the White Terror and the Shadow State accomplished was to push more people into the
EAM camp, as Edson had astutely noted. Resentment over indiscriminate arrests and other
atrocities helped EAM rebuild its base to about 700,000 by early 1946. “Prisoners go in as
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ordinary people and come out as communists” claimed an anonymous gendarme – a testament to
a growing solidarity on the Left, as well as the communists ability to clearly disseminate their
message.143

The British Behind the Scenes, Growing American Awareness, and Their Shifting Views

The British elections on July 5, 1945 that replaced Churchill’s conservative party with the
Labor party of Clement Attlee were perceived as beneficial for Greek right-wing republicans
because surely, the Labor Party would favor a republican form of government over a monarch if
given only those two choices.144 But to their eventual dismay, the Labor government in England
mostly continued Churchill’s policies which favored the return of the king.145
Incessant bickering, continued waves of terror, and the failure to bring Greek politicians
together into a coalition, forced Voulgaris to tender his resignation on August 3, 1945. The
British eventually talked him out of resigning, but he again lost faith when amid his proclamation
on October 6 that new elections would take place in January 1946, liberals, socialists, and
communists informed him that they would abstain from the election because there was no
possible way that the existing Greek government could restore law and order by that date; the
failure of Voulgaris and the British to restore some semblance of law and order in Greece was a
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major factor that negatively effected the ability to promote unity by successive governments in
Greece.146 For every party on the political spectrum except for the monarchical right, elections
without law in order would be tantamount to handing the country over to the king and the
monarchists. At first even the monarchists threatened to boycott elections because their demand
for a plebiscite to precede elections was denied. But as they came to realize their hold on the
state administration apparatus was as strong as ever, they became enthusiastic about their
chances and recanted.147
New British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin of the recently elected Labor government in
England sought to remedy the situation and attempted to form a center-moderate government
with yet another change in leadership. The eighty-three year-old leader of the Greek Liberal
Party, Themistocles Sophoulis was chosen by Bevin to attempt this feat, and he became Premier
in November 1945. The Greeks were now in the midst of their 5th change in government in
roughly a year and a half. American concerns about how the British Labor Party would handle
the Greek situation existed and showed that some Americans questioned the ability of Attlee’s
government to “hold the line” against future communist gains in Greece. Highlighting his
prejudices against the left in general, MacVeagh voiced his concerns by asking the Secretary of
State in December 1945, “what assurance have they [the Greek people] that British Labor Party
preoccupation with socialist dogma, or an American lapse of interest in Balkan affairs, may not
deliver Greece to communism…?”148 In hindsight, MacVeagh had nothing to worry about,
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because Attlee’s government was on board with previous administration’s attempts to keep
Greece under British influence, thereby securing control of the Middle East and
Mediterranean.149
Although British concern over right-wing excesses existed, their actions seemingly pulled
against their intentions. Sophoulis, aware that the continuing White Terror combined with the
fact that the true power of the state machinery lay in the hands of the shadow state, tried
unsuccessfully to get Bevin to accept a delay of Greek general elections. In February 1946,
roughly a month before elections were to take place, Sophoulis brought the request of an election
delay to Bevin. Sophoulis worried that the “whole machinery of the state [was] in the hands of
the extreme monarchist right” and that in these conditions, it would not be possible to guarantee
“a genuine expression of the popular will.”150 When U.S. Charge d’affaires in Greece Karl
Rankin wrote to the Secretary of State on March 8, 1946 regarding this issue, he inexplicably
attributed the request for a delay to outside pressures. Rankin wrote that the “Regent and we both
believe [that the] Leftist campaign for delays [was] ordered from abroad in order to sabotage the
elections, gain time to build up leftist strength and when ready seize power.”151 This statement
to the Secretary of State not only highlights the growing U.S. suspicions of Soviet involvement
in Greece but it also raises questions about the role of personal prejudices and ambitions of U.S.
and British statesmen. It is common knowledge in the historical discourse of the Greek civil war
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that in the midst of their persecution, Greek communists sought to secure Stalin’s support for
armed insurrection; but the latter through Soviet channels advised them to participate in the
elections of March 1946.152 Stalin, ever the pragmatist, had still not deviated from his agreement
with Churchill from October 1944. Soviet policy towards Greece, it is now known, was similar
to that of the British - geared toward containing the Greek left. Rankin could not have known
that the Soviets were staying out of Greek affairs, but it is difficult to understand what evidence
he used to formulate his opinions that they indeed were involved.
After the Varkiza Agreement of February 1945 the British started to face criticism from
the Soviets that their involvement was equal to a disguised occupation.153 Although Stalin was
sticking to the percentages agreement and “most scrupulously” respecting Britain’s’
predominance in Greece, the British continued to criticize Stalin for foregoing free elections in
eastern Europe and asserting Soviet dominance there. Probably realizing that their
denouncements of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe could be reciprocated, the British began
to conceal how actively involved they were in Greece. During the Plastiras administration in
early 1945 when Leeper requested a free hand to remove the Premier, the Foreign Office refused
because the “whole essence of our position in Greece is that our authority must be exercised
behind the scenes.”154 Additionally, in September 1945 in discussions with Leeper and the regent
over choosing a date for the king’s plebiscite, British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
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Affairs Orme Sargent agreed to lobby Greek politicians to move the decision to after the general
elections. Sargent argued that the British should intervene in the interests of the country’s longterm stability, but in the interests of appearances, the request for British help should come from
the Greeks.155 Similarly, the Americans too would employ this strategy in 1947 when they
become heavily involved in Greece’s internal affairs.
Nevertheless, to provide for free and fair elections across Europe’s devastated nations as
agreed upon by the powers at Yalta in February 1945, Anglo-American policy makers planned to
offer Greece tripartite supervision of general elections and the plebiscite by using U.S., British,
and Soviet representatives. Predictably, the Soviets declined, most likely so as not to provide the
western powers a precedent for interfering in the Soviet sphere.156
Despite Sophoulis’ plea to postpone elections and the left’s decision to abstain, elections
were to go ahead as planned for the set date of March 31, 1946 with U.S., British, and French
supervision. Amidst large scale intimidation of and abstention by the left, only 49 percent of
registered Greek voters cast their ballots. What this amounted to was an astounding victory for
the royalist right.157 The majority of seats in the new government – 236 out of 354 – went to
parties of the right, consisting of those that wished to continue malevolent policies against the
left.158 A week later, Constantine Tsaldaris of the Populist party took the Premiership. Adding
insult to the left’s injury, the new government ignored the country’s earlier pledge to punish
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wartime collaborators. American intelligence was aware of this trend, and U.S. intelligence agent
Thomas Karamessines reported 3 months later in July 1945 on the “wholesale acquittal or
discharge of accused collaborationists, in which Greek official government agencies or
personalities must be acquiescing.”159
The Greek-right, emboldened by their questionable victory at the polls (to which the
British and Americans were aware) stepped up its violent persecution of the left.160 The newly
elected regime in Athens wasted no time and set out on a course to institutionalize their
campaign of terror. Monarchist politicians and their allies in the gendarmerie and the army
pursued vindictive and partisan policies while appointing partisan supporters to all levels of
government, and purging anyone assumed sympathetic to the left.161 Endorsing the White
Terror, Tsaldaris and some of his ministers publically applauded the persecution of leftists, and
in May 1946, enacted a ruthless and draconian “Security Law” which allowed the government to
arrest, imprison, and deport citizens, without evidence. Arbitrarily applied, the law targeted not
only active leftists and their sympathizers, but also their families and friends. Ex-ELAS
members, republican officers, and heroes of the resistance under occupation were among those
exiled. By the end of 1946, only seven months after the law was established, 4,876 people were
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deported from Greece while over a thousand waited for their fate. By the end of the civil war,
estimates show that over 30,000 were deported.162
Amidst the widespread terror, an EAM delegation, as they had the previous year,
approached MacVeagh on July 31, 1946 for what amounted to an appeal for the United States to
intervene. On August 3, MacVeagh brought the Secretary of State up to date on developments in
Greece as he reported on the rise in violence and partisan activity. He reported that the Greek
government was not only on the verge of outlawing the communist party, but had a growing
tendency to “(1) consider all persons Communist unless Royalist, (2) to protect former Metaxists
and collaborators and (3) to accept armed assistance from disreputable elements professing
royalism.” MacVeagh also noticed that extremism had a several effects on the country when he
commented on the “Increasing exasperation of members of all Parliamentary opposition groups
apparent in this connection, and [the] strengthening rather than weakening of anti-king and even
pro-communist sentiment…as a result of present extremist policy of governing authorities.”163
Earlier in 1946 however, some in the United States showed an increasing tendency to
follow the British example of toleration toward the Greek right, regardless of the latter’s actions.
In April 1946 at a meeting with Bevin to discuss an early plebiscite for the king’s return, Bevin
recounted the Secretary of State’s endorsement of the plebiscite and claimed that “Byrnes [had]
said that it was essential that the Communists should not get into power in Greece. This must be
avoided at all costs. He did not mind how it was done.”164
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It is a small wonder, then, that Tsaldaris’ government was feeling empowered by its
recognition from the British, and the latter’s failure to do anything to stop the Greek right’s quest
to stamp out the Greek left. Amidst these highly favorable circumstances, the Greek government
in May 1946 proclaimed that in September of that year, an early plebiscite would be held to
determine the kings fate. In reality, his return was all but secured since the whole of the state
machinery lay in the hands of the monarchist right. Henceforth, their campaign of terror
virtually assured that the plebiscite would be rigged. Indeed, the results of the plebiscite which
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson considered “legitimate” returned the king to his throne
in Greece. However, the tripartite observers from Britain, France, and The United States made
note of a high degree of fraud, government harassment of individuals, and the unrealistic
assertion by the Greek government that 94% of the population had participated in the
plebiscite.165
In the meantime, EAM and the left in Greece were preoccupied with survival and selfdefense in light of the continued escalation of rightist violence. Their worst-case scenario was
playing out in front of them: the combined White Terror, British inaction to stop it, and
insistence on the return of the king amid shoddy election conditions surely must have signaled to
them that a return of the days of Metaxas dictatorship was at hand.166 The situation would only
deteriorate for Greek leftists from 1946 onward as the American role increased and picked up
where the British left off.
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American intelligence and diplomatic sources had mostly reported accurate details of the
situation in Greece and the British role in the conflict. The continuing extreme rightist violence
and the British tolerance of it was something that concerned the Americans in the field. But
American attitudes about, and involvement in the Greek situation were to drastically change in
the near future.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEW ADMINISTRATION, NEW AGENDA - U.S.
INVOLVEMENT AND CHANGING ATTITUDES, 1945 TO 1949

From 1943 to the beginning of 1946, the position of the United States in Greece was
mostly one of discrete examination and criticisms of the British role there. MacVeagh and some
other Americans had shown attitudes that somewhat reflected anti-communist prejudices, but the
extent of rightist violence began to concern them. Nevertheless, regarding the question of Soviet
involvement, American sources in the field were mostly on the same page. Up until the summer
of 1946, American diplomats and intelligence sources in Greece dismissed British claims that the
Soviets were in any way involved with events there, and some had shown concern that the
British were supporting a reactionary regime in Athens. Indeed, Americans in the field were
seemingly unanimous in their assertions that Stalin was strictly adhering to the percentages
agreement between him and Churchill. But two very important changes in leadership occurred in
1945 with the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, and the ousting of Churchill in July
1945, both of which eventually led to changes in British and American policy in Greece. In the
course of one year, the United States took a new attitude towards the Greek conflict, and a new
aggressive stance towards communism in general. This about-face had profound consequences
for Greece. This chapter examines the development of this new American stance, which, led to
growing U.S. involvement in the Greek conflict.
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Changing American Perceptions of Soviet Involvement: 1945-1947

In January 1945 after the British had secured the defeat of EAM/ELAS in the capital, the
U.S. embassy reported on the possibility of Soviet influence in the Greek conflict. On January
10, the American embassy replied that rumors of Soviet involvement were “alarmist and often
hearsay material…tendentious and untrustworthy.” On February 27, 1945 after the Yalta
conference attended by Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt, the U.S. embassy in Greece informed
the State Department that evidence of Soviet involvement was non-existent. MacVeagh
commented that the decisions reached at the Yalta conference must have been “disappointing to
ELAS…[because] ELAS [had] found out that Russia will not support it against Britain.” The
report concluded by highlighting that “[the] British ambassador [is] content [to] say that he can
find no evidence [that] Russia’s supporting ELAS.” The British ambassador which MacVeagh
referred to indeed had evidence, but “evidence to the contrary.” 167 Even Churchill, the ardent
anti-communist ever distrustful of Stalin commented after Yalta that indeed, the Russians were
“most scrupulously” respecting the predominance of Britain in Greece.168
Nevertheless, Harry Truman upon his assumption of the presidency in April 1945
immediately took a firm stance against what he saw as Soviet aggression and expansion and
surrounded himself with what historian Daniel Yergin describes as a “rigidly anti-Soviet group
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of American diplomats.”169 Truman was initially perturbed by the Soviets and viewed their
intentions suspiciously because of their violations of the agreed upon terms at the Yalta
Conference of February 1945. Under the terms of Yalta, the Big Three were to assist the people
of liberated Europe in solving their economic and political problems by democratic means. But
the Soviet Union had recently imposed a government in Poland dominated by communists and
was encouraging communist movements in Romania and Yugoslavia. On April 22, 1945 - ten
days after Roosevelt died - Truman, in a demand to ensure that Russia abide by the terms of
Yalta used what he himself called “sharp language” in a meeting with Soviet minister V.M.
Molotov who subsequently complained of never having been talked to like that in his life.
Additionally, in May 1945 the administration unexpectedly terminated lend-lease assistance to
the Soviets, a decision that Stalin labeled as “unfortunate and brutal.”170 And towards the end of
1945, the President was forming an increasingly suspicious view towards the Soviets in light of
their interests in the Middle East and Turkey, and it was assumed the Soviets sought warm-water
ports in the Persian Gulf area.171
Adding fuel to the fire Stalin delivered a speech on February 9, 1946 that was interpreted
as proclaiming that socialism and capitalism were incompatible and that future wars between the
two systems were inevitable, with socialism as the eventual victor.172 Already highly suspicious
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of Stalin’s plans, and because of his recent comments on socialism eventually replacing
capitalism, the State Department subsequently asked well-respected U.S. Foreign Service officer
in Moscow, George F. Kennan, to provide his analysis of what the U.S. might expect in the
future from the Soviets. Kennan’s analysis, known as the “Long Telegram” became what Cold
War historian John Lewis Gaddis called “to this day the single most influential explanation of
postwar Soviet behavior” and “one which powerfully reinforced the growing tendency within the
United States to interpret Moscow’s actions in a sinister light.”173 In the telegram, Kennan
portrayed the Soviet Union as a threatening monolith, but at the same time stated that the country
was too week to purse their goals through war - the main threat, he asserted, was political. Soviet
communism, “like a malignant parasite” would aim to penetrate and influence organizations such
as labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, cultural groups, and racial societies, with
the goal of tearing down “sources of strength beyond the reach of Soviet control.” The Soviets
would expose the “mistakes and weaknesses of the Western Powers” and try to gain “command
of key positions in administration…of foreign countries.174 The way to counter the threat,
Kennan claimed, was through sustained projection of American strength, superiority, and
patience.175
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Kennan’s report from Moscow, although highly influential, was not the “lightning bolt”
that awakened U.S. policymakers to the perceived dangers of the Soviet threat; as noted above,
Truman and his aides had viewed the Soviets with suspicion as early as April 1945 when he took
office. But widely circulated throughout the administration, the telegram must have strengthened
the preexisting attitudes of those who already distrusted the Soviets, and it probably cemented
Truman’s inclination to a tougher stance toward Moscow. Additionally, its message became
something of a rallying point for the administration, something that they could use in order to
justify a strong stance in response to Soviet actions anywhere. What it also did, was help distort
the view in Washington on the situation in Greece, and it reduced the complicated events there to
a simplistic inaccurate view that Moscow responsible.176 So as earlier reports from the field told
one story, a radically different view was taking shape in Washington which assumed problems in
Greece were part of a wider international situation.
On March 8, 1946, a few weeks prior to Greek elections that the Soviets advised the KKE
to participate in, U.S. Charge d’affaires in Athens Karl Rankin commented to the Secretary of
State on the call from centrist and leftist groups to delay the elections.177 As stated previously,
they did this for fear that in the atmosphere of persecution from forces of the Shadow State, fair
elections could not possibly take place. Rankin, citing no source, claimed that “The Leftist
campaign for delay [was] ordered from abroad in order to sabotage the elections, gain time to
build up leftist strength, and when ready, seize power.”178
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In August, after the Soviets requested a revision to the Montreux convention in order to
permit a joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Dardanelles Straits which connects the Black Sea to
the Mediterranean, Dean Acheson in a meeting with U.S. officials claimed that this pressure on
Turkey “reflected a desire to control and dominate that country” and that had these demands
been accepted, they “would be followed next by infiltration and domination of Greece by Russia
with the obvious consequences in the Middle East.”179
Ambassador MacVeagh, the main source of American information on Greece had
delivered mostly precise information to Washington regarding the actions of the communists,
Soviets, British, and successive Greek governments up until mid-1946. Adding to MacVeagh’s
skepticism of Soviet involvement back in January, again in July 1945 he dismissed the notion.
Amidst more claims by the British that KKE policy and funding came from the Soviets, the
American ambassador dismissed these claims as a “psychological element in the situation.”
From a secret source, MacVeagh reported that there was “no direct evidence…found to prove a
financial connection between the Soviets and [the] KKE” while also commenting that the Soviets
were showing themselves “to be supreme realists…[who] do not feel it necessary…to do more
than fan the flames with a sympathetic press and radio.”180 And on August 10, 1946, MacVeagh,
commenting on Greek government complaints that the KKE was a Soviet “fifth column” again
dismissed them and stated that, “practically every one [of the Greek government’s complaints]
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against the KKE was made a year ago.” He also added a scathing critique of the Greek
government:

Under the guise of royalism this program actually approximates Fascism…[and the
government is]…continually enlarging their definition of Communism to include all who
do not support the return of the King.181

Astonishingly, two weeks later, MacVeagh made a brisk about-face. In late August, with
no apparent evidence, MacVeagh suddenly reversed his position and wrote to the Department of
State that the KKE was secretly controlled by the Soviets.182 On September 30, 1946, in reply to
the State Department’s request for his views on the Greek situation, MacVeagh wrote, “Add
continued anti-Greek Moscow propaganda and secret Soviet control of Greek Communist
Party…conclusion seems inevitable that Soviet Government in final analysis must be assigned
responsibility for continued Greek strife.”183
MacVeagh’s claims are difficult to explain in light of his earlier reports. John Iatrides has
suggested that MacVeagh’s shift in thought quite possibly represented a case of “Groupthink”
which could explain the “arbitrary adaptation of intelligence from the field” in order to “uphold
the prevailing view at the center of the decision-making process.”184 Iatrides calls attention to
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the fact that MacVeagh was in the United States from January1946 to late June 1946 because his
wife was seriously ill, and during his visit, he had protracted meetings in the Department of State
where Greek issues were discussed at length. Additionally, discussions regarding the
administration’s frustration over Soviet policies in Europe took place between MacVeagh, the
administration, and Truman. Iatrides, although admitting there is no way to prove this, asserts
that it is possible to assume that MacVeagh’s thought process on the Soviet role was highly
influenced by his discussions in Washington. He also points out that MacVeagh suddenly
became more amenable to British policy in Greece too, quite possibly because the British doctors
who treated his wife had “practically saved her life.”185 Nevertheless, MacVeagh continued
these assertions throughout the next few years, following the lead of his superiors in Washington.
The charges against the Soviet Union concerning its role in Greece intensified toward end
of 1946. On September 12, Acting Secretary of State William Clayton in a top secret note wrote
to the Secretary of State about the need to help militarily and economically the countries under
Soviet pressure, one of which he claimed, was Greece:

in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when members’ strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action…(and) a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality
testing, and moral judgment that results from ingroup pressures.
185
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…in view of the policy which the Soviet Union appears to be…endeavoring to
undermine the stability and to obtain control of the countries in the Near and Middle East
such as Greece, Turkey and Iran, we should make certain general changes in our policies,
including those relating to the sale of combat equipment…to strengthen [the] will and
ability…of the various countries under Soviet pressure to resist that pressure…Soviet
agents are undoubtedly responsible for the smuggling of arms to, and for strengthening
of, groups in Greece.186

A memorandum regarding Greece prepared by the Office of Near Eastern and African
Affairs dated October 21, 1946 made over-the-top assumptions about Moscow’s role in the
Greek crisis by contending that hatreds in Greece were “being kept alive…by the activities of an
apparently well-organized and armed Communist-dominated minority supported by the
U.S.S.R.” The memorandum co-opted a panicked theme while claiming:

We cannot afford to stand idly by in the face of [the] maneuvers and machinations [of the
Soviets] which evidence an intention on the part of the Soviet Union to expand its power
by subjugating Greece to its will, and then using Greece as an important stepping stone
for further expansion of Soviet Power…There can be no question that the U.S.S.R. is
providing military assistance to elements seeking to cause the fall of the Greek
Government…Such [a] military threat against stability in Greece makes it urgent that the
U.S. increase and intensify its political and economic assistance promptly, lest it come
too late.
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Not only was the U.S. stepping up its claims that Soviets were involved, but the theme of hurried
assistance was also broached, as the memorandum called for assistance that was vital to U.S.
security interests. It was important to aid the Greek Government “before the fact” so that in the
case of renewed civil conflict, a sudden increase of assistance would not be necessary.187
And in December 1946, another memorandum, this one by Harry N. Howard of the U.S.
Division of Research for the Near East and Africa, elaborated on incidents on the northern Greek
frontier. He claimed that, taken together, these incidents left “little doubt of Soviet intentions.”
As evidence, Howard cited Moscow’s radio propaganda attacks against the Greek
government.188
Having come to the conclusion that the Soviets were responsible for Greek communist’s
actions, the Truman administration demonstrated a growing willingness to render American help
to the Greek government. Like the British, they were concerned lest that their actions would give
the Soviets a pretext to criticize American involvement in the political affairs of another country
at a time when the British and Americans were criticizing the Soviets for their actions in Eastern
Europe.
The U.S. administration, although not yet completely decided on the question of military
aid to the Greek government, proposed a curious solution. In a letter from November 8, 1946 to
MacVeagh, the acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented on “the policy which we
should pursue concerning the question of providing such arms and military supplies as might be
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necessary to maintain law and order [in Greece].” According to Acheson, the U.S. did not want
to give the Greeks the impression that U.S. interest in their plight was “not sufficiently deep to
run the risk of internal or international criticism arising from the supply of arms and military
equipment to Greece.” But on the other hand, he continued, “we have concern lest in case we
supply [this equipment]…the impression be obtained that we are carrying on a provocative
policy with regard to the Soviet Union.” Acheson proposed that “British troops [were] in Greece
and since…Great Britain [had] been supplying Greece with arms and military equipment, it
would be preferable for Greeks to obtain such supplies from Great Britain.” The Americans,
Acheson claimed, would “endeavor to strengthen the economic position of Greece” but in the
case that the British could not supply military equipment and weapons, Americans would
“furnish such supplies to Great Britain for delivery to Greece.” Acheson instructed MacVeagh to
inform Greek officials that American reluctance to openly furnish this assistance was not due to
their lack of commitment towards their country, but “rather to our feeling that in the world
situation, the wiser course would be for the Greeks to look to Great Britain.”189 It is possible that
Acheson was reluctant to openly aid the Greek government due to it being comprised of
collaborators and right-wing reactionaries, which might have made aid difficult to justify.
It is apparent that by the end of 1946, the American government was working under the
assumption that the Soviets were responsible for troubles in Greece and that they directed the
communists there. In spite of continuous reports from Athens-based diplomats who refuted
claims of direct Soviet involvement, this assumption held say over decision-makers in
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Washington. This latter fact led, in its own turn, to the change in emphasis in relations from the
field, and not the other way around.

Mobilizing Support for Aid to Greece

By February 1947, the British - exhausted from supporting a Greek government and in
the midst of severe economic difficulties - alerted the Truman administration that it would stick
to its March 31, 1947 date for termination of the aid to Greeks that it had set back in June 1946.
A lot of credit has been given to this notification by the British as the wake up call for American
involvement. But in reality, it only served to nudge more quickly the American commitment to
Greece; the United States was well aware of British exhaustion and had been preparing for a new
role the previous year.190
Once the Truman administration convinced itself that the Soviets were responsible for the
troubles in Greece, the issue then became how to sell the idea to a war-weary public that it was
somehow in the interests of the United States to prevent the Soviets from further expansion into
the southern-most country of the Balkans. By this very token, the stand against communism had
to start in Greece. But a major problem facing the administration was in garnering the support it
needed from a war-weary public and a Republican Congress who desired not a new international
effort, but speedy demobilization and fiscal retrenchment.191
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The administration subsequently decided that the easiest way to win public support for
the Greece initiative was by propagating the simplistic and highly inaccurate idea that democracy
in Greece was under fire from the Soviets. The administration organized a three week publicity
campaign designed to win public and congressional approval for $300 million aid to Greece, and
$100 million for Turkey.192 On February 24 1947, a State Department memorandum of a Special
Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, noted that attendees advised of a plan that
“would have to be presented to Congress in such a fashion as to electrify the American
people.”193 In meetings with congressional leaders on February 28, 1947 George Marshall and
Dean Acheson sought to convince them about the importance of aiding the Greeks. Marshall
started the discussions by referencing the strategic and economic importance of Greece in the
broader picture of the eastern Mediterranean.194 Congressional leaders were not impressed by his
“realpolitik” description of the situation. Acheson, aware of the relative disinterest in the room,
took up the podium. In his presentation, he described a theoretically ominous picture of the
international scene which, devoid of immediate U.S. aid would lead to a situation whereby “twothirds…of the world…[would be]…controlled by communists.”195 Especially impressed by
Acheson’s depiction, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur
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Vandenberg recommended that Truman make an appearance in front of Congress in order to
“scare the hell out of the country.196
But U.S. policymakers had reservations about what the exact message to Congress and
the American people should be. Not wanting to provoke the Soviets outright, policymakers set
out on a course to construct a message that emphasized a picture of a democratic Greece under
pressure from the Soviet-led communists. But the challenge in forming this message, was to
make it clear that the Soviets were to blame, without specifically mentioning them outright.
Minutes of a February 27, 1947 meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC) Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information, show that attendees struggled to find a
way to do this. Shinning light on U.S. attempts to avoid directly blaming the Soviets, one
participant noted that “There are ways of making [the] situation perfectly clear without
specifically mentioning Russia.” Some were hesitant to include wording that emphasized the
portrayal of America confronting world communist revolution.197 Most participants agreed that
American policy had to “relate military aid to the principle of supporting democracy.” One
participant, Major General A.V. Arnold opined that emphasizing the threat to democracy was
“the only thing that [could] sell [the foreign aid package to the] public.”198 One wonders if
policymakers realized the irony involved in framing the argument in terms of the defense of
democracy, especially since the Greek government was anything but democratic.
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The Greeks would have a part to play too in selling the aid package to the American
public. The next day, on February 28, 1947 the State Department drafted a top secret letter for
the Greek government to present to the United States requesting urgent aid. The Greeks under
directions from the U.S. were to formally present the letter drafted by the U.S. to the U.S.
“without delay” in order to “initiate immediate steps to implement extraordinary assistance.”199
The Greek government responded three days later accepting it in its entirety. The next day on
March 4, Secretary of State George Marshall told the press that the U.S. was considering aiding
the Greek government.200 President Truman’s speech to Congress a few days later on March 12,
1947 contained a reference to the Greek government’s request for aid.
Those involved in engineering the official American position continued to have anxieties
about certain information reaching the public. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the American public
would have backed a program of massive foreign aid had they been more informed on the
intricacies of Greek situation and the composition of its government. One of the statesmen who
was concerned about this issue was Deputy Chief of the Mission of Economic Affairs, Paul
Porter, who wrote directly to Truman on March 3, urging the President to precondition American
aid upon the cessation of hostilities by the Greek government. He cabled, “You are aware of
[the] complete reactionary nature of [the] present [Greek] Government. But one must work with
them as I have to understand how incredibly weak, stupid, and venal they really are.” Porter
continued by asking the President if the U.S. could “offer [the] people of Greece something more

199

The Secretary of State to the Greek Embassy, 28 February 1947, FRUS, 1947, V: 69.

200

Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 73.

91

than bloodshed and tyranny?”201 MacVeagh and Porter worked closely together in Greece
during the beginning of 1947, but the former did not hold the same views as the latter. However,
MacVeagh must have taken something from his time with Porter because he subsequently wrote
to the Secretary of State on March 4 that the “Greatest care should be taken to avoid giving the
impression that [the] U.S. aim[s] at financing Greek ‘civil war’ or maintaining in power an
essentially reactionary govt incapable of developing sound economic program on democratic
principles.” MacVeagh continued with suggestions that were intended to make aid more
digestible to the public. He opined that “Perhaps the [American] aim might be stated to insure
opportunity for broader democratic government and greater implementation of political, social,
and economic responsibility than now is possible.”202 Viewing Porter as dangerous to the aim of
the new U.S. policy towards Greece, MacVeagh prompted the State Department to quiet him in
the future by offering him a “regular” government job.203
Policymakers in Washington continued the careful formulation of their Greek-Turkish aid
program into March 1947. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson cabled Secretary George
Marshall who was in Berlin on March 7, 1945 and described the meetings in Washington with
committees and the President, informing him that they “had reached the conclusion that he
[Truman] had no choice but to go forward with the [Greek-Turkish aid] program” and that the
President would address a joint session of Congress, along with the public over radio. Acheson
also noted that the President planned “to call together next week some financial, business, and

201

Porter to Truman, March 3, 1947, “American Economic Mission to Greece – Correspondence and Memoranda,
(1946 – 47)” folder, Porter papers, quoted in Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 69.
202

MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 4 March 1947, FRUS, 1947, V: 90.

203

Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 69.

92

labor people, both to get their energetic support at home and to provide recruits for missions
which may have to go to Greece to work there.”204 Apparently, Acheson forwarded Marshall a
draft of the President’s planned speech, to which Marshall on the same day requested changes to
it that he deemed as a direct challenge to the Soviets.205
On March 11, 1947, Acheson wrote to the American embassy in Greece that U.S. policy
would be different than that of the British, and that the U.S. would “abandon stopgap measures
and embark on a program of substantial aid to maintain Greek independence which may require
several years.” He then informed the U.S. embassy in Greece about how American aid to Greece
should be broached with the U.S. public:

In order that Congress and [the] U.S. public be fully informed, [a] program [was] being
implemented of frank and detailed background discussions with members of Congress,
radio commentators, [and] columnists…One of the Dept’s main aims…is to make clear
to the U.S. public and rest of the world…that any aid extended to Greece is in the interest
of world peace and U.S. security, and is not to assist carrying on any Brit[ish] policy in
Greece.206
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Truman’s Speech to Congress and its Aftermath

Following the earlier advice from Vandenberg, Truman delivered his speech to Congress
on March 12, 1947. In his opening sentences, the President got straight to the point by letting his
audience know that, in the contents of this speech “The foreign policy and national security of
this country [the United States were] involved.” He continued by citing the contrived Greek
government request for aid by claiming, “The United States has received from the Greek
government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance.” Citing “preliminary
reports” from the U.S. presence in Greece, Truman claimed that assistance to Greece was
“imperative if Greece [were] to survive as a free nation.” The President painted an ominous
picture of a devastated Greece that was now under a threat “from a militant minority, exploiting
human want and misery” who was able to “create political chaos” and in effect, had “made
economic recovery impossible.” In his first few sentences, the President had placed the blame on
Greek communists for nearly all of Greece’s post-war problems. President Truman continued
and made questionable statements as to the reasons for the Greek governments problems. He
claimed:
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The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of
several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority…
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation… Greece must
have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The
United States must supply this assistance… There is no other country to which
democratic Greece can turn.

The President’s address continued to use imprecise information meant to persuade
Congress and the public of the need for American involvement. In commenting on the
imperfections of the Greek government, but obviously aware of their true composition and
knowing full-well that the Greek elections in March 1946 had been rigged, Truman proclaimed:

The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five percent of
the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign
observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of
the views of the Greek people…The Greek government has been operating in an
atmosphere of chaos and extremism.

The President then proceeded to make a broader ideological statement without, however,
specifically mentioning the Soviets. There was nevertheless, little doubt however, as to whom
the President was referring:
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The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes
forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made
frequent protests against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta agreement in
Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria… At the present moment in world history nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of life… I believe that it must be the policy
of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures.207

As minutes of preceding discussions of top U.S. officials clearly indicate, the U.S.
decision to assist Greece stemmed from its geostrategic significance to America’s interests,
rather than idealistic notions of democracy and freedom. But as Joseph M. Jones, former member
of the State Department and author of The Fifteen Weeks noted, the former theme was
deliberately excluded from the Truman Doctrine speech because “the American people were not
accustomed to thinking…in strategic-military terms in time of peace.”208 The theme of freedom
and democracy under fire from the Soviet system offered a better chance to win the American
public’s support, so the President had strongly played on this theme in his speech.
Nevertheless, the President’s message to Congress received mixed reviews. On March
13, 1947 Acheson wrote to George Marshall about the President’s speech and informed him that
at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on March 13, there were “many doubts and worries”
but the administration was going to soon “address a meeting of publishers” in order to get their
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message to the public.209 The previous day, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
suggested the administration meet with major American publishers in order to lobby them for
public support. Forrestal spoke with James Reston of the New York Times and stated that they
“should…get the publishers like Arthur Sulzberger and Ed Hoyt and Paul Smith and [Henry]
Luce…and make them aware that this…will need sustained educational effort.” He also added
that it would be necessary to appraise “the radio people” as well.210
From March 13, to April 3, 1947, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings
to discuss the Greek-Turkish aid bill. In the process, the committee interviewed administration
officials as well as diplomats from Greece. During the meeting certain members questioned
unilateral action by the U.S. and asked why the U.N. could not handle the Greek situation.
Senator Vandenberg replied that the U.N. “did not have the military resources available” nor did
it have the funds. He also noted that if the Greek government were to be funded by the U.N., the
money “would have to come largely from the United States, and the position of the United States
has been that it wants to control funds supplied by it.”211 Vandenberg also expressed his concern
about the public’s understanding of the situation. He claimed that the public would never
understand it “unless we dramatize this thing in every possible way.” In another instance that
highlighted American geostrategic concerns, Navy Secretary Forrestal stated that “American
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interest in the Mediterranean is not a new thing”, when specifically asked about U.S. interests in
the region.
When MacVeagh was called to testify before the committee on March 28, he again
betrayed all his previous findings in Greece. Explaining the road to Greece’s current situation,
MacVeagh attributed the independent Greek Naval mutinies of April 1944 to the Greek
communists:

the Communists had come up to take charge of the resistance when we were in Egypt,
and they fomented mutinies in the Greek forces in Cairo…it was instigated by the
communist organizers…the rank and file [of those instigating the mutinies]…were agents
of the Communist movement.212

Asked about who in his estimation was ultimately responsible for Greece’s postwar
problems, MacVeagh stated that “the fellow to blame was the fellow who controls the little
countries to the north of Greece, the fellow who is backing them right square back to the
Moscow government.”213 MacVeagh, in another questionable display noted that the President’s
speech alone had positive far reaching effects. When asked by the chairman of the hearing if
“these powerful minorities [Greek communists]…[are]…going to sit idly by and watch us come
in and checkmate this entire prospectus” MacVeagh replied, “They are already on the run.
Senator, with just the statement by the President. It has shocked those fellows so much that they
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are already beginning to show weakness.”214 The ambassador to Greece also downplayed the
accomplishments of EAM, distorted actual numbers of leftist support in Greece at 9.3% of the
electorate, and made the highly erroneous statement that only communist groups had abstained
from the March 1946 elections.215 Clearly, MacVeagh’s days of offering the United States
government accurate information on the Greek situation had ended.
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Edwin C. Wilson was also debriefed by the committee and
informed them on U.S. geopolitical interests relating to Turkey, especially regarding the position
of that country as a barrier to Soviet encroachments in places of U.S. interest. Wilson claimed
that if Turkey were “allowed to fall under Soviet domination…there [would be] nothing between
them [the Soviets] then, and the Persian Gulf, Suez Canal, on out to the East – Afghanistan,
India, and China…” Thus, he concluded, it was “vitally important to give assistance to the Turks
to maintain their independent position there.”216
In a rare display of candidness, Ambassador Wilson told the committee that “what we are
doing here is not because we like the color of the eyes of the Turks or the Greeks…We are doing
it because it is in our own interests. Continuing the budding trend of the U.S. to consider the
toleration toward the Greek right, Wilson claimed, “we would do it regardless of what regime
was in Turkey or Greece.”217 But apparently the committee was concerned that telling this
frankly to the American public was not a good idea. Vandenberg agreed with everything Wilson
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had said about the strategic value of Turkey and Greece, but identified that there was a problem
with this. The chairman stated, “Now we are down to the question, what reason can you give the
American people publically to identify our self-interest in this program?” The ambassador’s
answer to this question began with a statement about supporting democratic principles and
independence movements to which Vandenberg interjected, “Why does that involve
ourselves?...it is a question that has to be answered, and we have got to know how far we can go
in answering it.” Ambassador Wilson asked for more time to think the question over because he
“[did] not know how far one could go in stating what are the facts publically.”218
When the committee met again on April 1, 1947 to further discuss the bill, more U.S.
interests were broached - this time oil. Senator Wiley in a frank discussion with Dean Acheson
said that:

Our interest is in oil, and whatever other strategic material is furnished in the Near
East…we have something with which to fight [for], and that is oil. That is strategic
material. We have depleted our own in the last world war to such an extent that nobody
knows what the cost is going to be to us in the future.

Senator Wiley seemed to suggest that politicians be upfront with the American people because
“[they] are not as dumb as we sometimes assume they are. The question of self-interest here is
the dominant factor. It is not simply feeding the Greeks.”219
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When the committee returned on April 3, the toleration of the Greek regime was again
approached, among other topics, and the outcome of discussions was consistent with the earlier
stance of “anyone but the communists.” Senator Walter F. George from Georgia asked Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge from Massachusetts, “Have you not got to support whatever governments
there are in Greece and Turkey?” to which Lodge replied, “You have to work through them,
yes.” George seemed to agree and stated that, “We cannot go in there and upset them and set up
another government. If we do that we are engaging in the exercise of a thing that we have always
said we would not do, interfering directly with the internal affairs of another country.”220
Apparently, the vast economic, military, and logistical aid that the committee was endorsing was
not considered by Senator George to be interference in Greece’s affairs. And so on April 3rd
1947, the bill regarding assistance to Greece and Turkey was approved by the committee and
recommended to the Senate for passing.

American Intervention: June 1947 to October 1949

The President signed the bill for aid to Greece and Turkey into law on May 22, 1947.
When officials of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) entered the capital in June
1947, the Greek right was represented mostly by the Populists and Tsaldaris, while the moderate
center parties were represented by Sophoulis. The KKE had stepped up guerilla activities back in
June 1946 amidst rising persecution and created their new military wing, the Democratic Army
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of Greece (DAG) in December 1946.221 In February 1947, the Greek communists again stepped
up their guerilla activities and prepared for larger scale operations, quite possibly in anticipation
of British withdrawal. The British however did not stick to their withdraw date of March 31,
1947 and kept their military and diplomatic presence in Greece, albeit on a smaller scale. King
George II died in April 1947, and his brother Paul, who had in his earlier days directed General
Metaxas’ neo-fascist National Youth Organization, ascended the Greek throne.222
Americans would run into problems similar to what the British had encountered, mostly
regarding questions about effective Greek leadership and the inability of Greece’s politicians to
form a useful coalition government representative of the broader population. American
policymakers continued to have concerns over how their involvement was perceived and again
took measures to conceal their level of involvement in Greek politics. Like the British before
them, the new American patrons of Greece orchestrated Greek politics much the same – by
tolerating the Greek right, and by blocking the left’s access to representation in the government.
American intervention in Greek politics was swift. The attitude of the chief of the
AMAG, Dwight Griswold immediately foreshadowed the American level of involvement into
Greek affairs. In a memorandum of a conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs, it was noted that Griswold “asked several questions as to the policy
of this government in Greece” and indicated that he was “interested particularly in such
questions as the possibility of reorganizing the Greek government.” Griswold felt that “certain
changes [to the government] might be necessary” and that some members of the Greek
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government who would not cooperate, “would have to be eliminated.” Initially, he understood
that the administration wanted to keep American involvement in Greek politics out of the public
eye. So as not to appear as intimately involved, Griswold thought that “it would however be
necessary to proceed discretely” and it would be “desirable that any changes in the
government…should be effected in such a manner that the Greeks would feel they themselves
had brought about the changes.” Secretary of State George Marshall agreed with these assertions
and pointed out that American ventures in Greece “would be under close scrutiny.”223
On July 11, 1947 the Secretary of State wrote to Griswold regarding American aims and
official policy for Greece. Continuing to blame the Soviets, Marshall wrote that “Greece today
should be viewed against the background of a world-wide Communist effort to subvert
governments and institutions not already subservient to the Soviet Union.” Shedding light on an
American policy that continued to tolerate the extreme right, Marshall told Griswold, not that the
U.S. desired a Greek government that broadly represented the population, but one that included
into it, anybody but communists:

We desire to see in Greece a government whose members are firmly united in their
loyalty to Greece and who are primarily interested in keeping their country from falling
under communist control or Soviet domination….they should…pursue [this] objective
with complete single-mindedness of purpose.

223

Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 9 July
1947, FRUS, 1947, V: 215-216.

103

In the same letter to Griswold, Secretary of State Marshall also wrote about excesses of the right,
but by no means condemned them. Marshall wrote:

We are aware of the fact that in its efforts to combat the subversive movement, there is a
tendency on the part of certain elements in the Greek government to employ strong
measures and to make use of strong personalities, such as Mr. Zervas, chief of the
gendarmerie. We should realize that stern and determined measures… may be necessary
to effect the termination of activities of the guerillas…

Indeed, at the insistence of the Americans, in July of 1947, known extreme right-wing
commander Napoleon Zervas was to re-organize much of the gendarmerie into military
battalions that subsequently intensified the white terror. Additionally, Marshall told Griswold
that American officials should never criticize people in the Greek government, nor any British
officials because this would “directly serve the communist purpose of discrediting the members
of the present government.”224
During July 1947, the communists still hoped for a political solution to the Greek crisis
and on July 13, submitted their demands for ending hostilities to the British through liberal
leader Sophoulis. The following were the communists four terms:
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1. Resignation of the present government
2. Dissolution of Parliament
3. Formation of “pure center government” under Sophoulis with cooperation [of] such
leaders as Tsouderos, Plastiras, and Mylonas.
4. Agreement between new government and KKE on basis of “Sophoulis’s policy of
appeasement”, i.e. general amnesty, guarantee of security to those laying down arms, and
promise of new elections soonest on basis [of] revised electoral lists.225

Interesting to note is the fact that communists were willing to accept Plastiras into a reformed
coalition government, especially in light of his attitudes toward them in the first half of 1945; it
was under Plastiras’ premiership that the White Terror began shortly after the Dekemvriana. But
as Lawrence Wittner noted, the former Prime Minister had slowly transformed into an advocate
of attempts to end the fratricide by 1947.226
Although Greek communists signaled that they would be willing to end hostilities and be
incorporated into a coalition government, U.S. policy, it seemed, would not allow this option.
Five days after the KKE delivered its terms for peace, on July 18, 1947 Marshall cabled back to
MacVeagh that although the KKE’s demands were “fair sounding…we consider [their]
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proposals to be insincere and dangerous, and that any serious consideration of them could only
strengthen Communists hand…”227
A larger problem, though, began to develop for the Americans in Greece, as both the
AMAG and the embassy claimed jurisdiction over politics there.228 In the Fall of 1947, a
conflict developed between the AMAG and the American embassy in Greece, mostly over a
dispute of which political group should lead a reformed Greek government; MacVeagh
supported Populist leadership of Tsaldaris, but Griswold favored liberal leadership by Sophoulis.
By August 1947, the Populists had won favor with the Americans and a new completely Populist
government was set up with Tsaldaris once again taking the premiership.
Bickering between the embassy and AMAG was only part of the administration’s
concerns. Failing to conceal the American level of involvement in Greece, the State Department
was critical of Griswold’s lack of discreetness because a recent article in the New York Times had
dubbed him as the “most powerful man in Greece” at the beginning of October 1947.229 Acting
Secretary of State Robert Lovett wrote Griswold on October 17, 1947 that the State Department
considered the New York Times article “as [a] most unfortunate misrepresentation of [the] U.S.
role in Greece” and that “U.S. officials…[were to]…avoid involvement in details of Greek
internal politics.”230 Having changed his earlier stance that American involvement should be
played behind the scenes, on October 24, 1947, Griswold responded to the Secretary of State,
complaining that “it would be wrong for AMAG or for [the] U.S. government to attempt to
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represent to world opinion that AMAG does not have great power or that it is not involved in
Greek internal affairs.” Griswold explained that a projection of American power would be of
good use to any U.S. aid missions if “good results [were] to be obtained and U.S.
policy…[were] to be successful.”231 Marshall, responding on November 4 to Griswold’s
previous letter, admitted that indeed, “the U.S. government [was] in fact…necessarily involved
[in] certain aspects [of] Greek internal affairs” but disagreed with Griswold’s suggestion that
drawing attention to this fact would benefit the mission. Marshall told Griswold that “American
influence [was to be] exercised as discreetly as possible” and that “credit and responsibility for
all measures [were to] be attributed to the Greek government and people whenever possible.”232
Disputes between MacVeagh and Griswold led to the former’s removal from Greece at
the end of October 1947, and his eventual reassignment as Ambassador to Portugal by November
1948. The State Department decided not to fill MacVeagh’s position in October 1947, and
instead opted to unite the role of ambassador and head of AMAG into one position. By July
1948, Griswold was reassigned and replaced by former ambassador to India, Henry F. Grady.233
As the end of 1947 approached, the United States continued the implementation of their
aid program alongside a Greek government that was still lacking effective leadership, with the
ultimate aim of defeating communism in Greece as the most pressing concern. Democracy in
Greece was of little concern to the Americans at this juncture, and their willingness to keep in
power the Greek right was in line with past British policy. No options were off the table for the
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Americans, as a right-wing dictatorship was even contemplated. This was highlighted by various
American correspondence at the end of 1947 through 1948. On October 30, 1947, the first
commander of the U.S. Army detachment in Greece, Colonel Charles R. Lehner, wrote to his
superiors that “a government comparable to that formed by Metaxas” was what was needed in
Greece because “A democratic form of government…[would be] too mild to counteract the
powerful methods employed by enemies of the government.”234 And the coordinator of the aid
program for Greece and Turkey, George McGhee wrote on February 24, 1948 to Marshall that,
“the effectiveness of the Greek people [as] an instrument of our policy [could] be increased if
certain further steps were taken, much as we might dislike taking them. This includes bringing
about the creation of a more authoritarian government.”235
As the British had done during their tenure in Greece, the Americans too were willing to
look the other way or even sanction executions, imprisonment, and exile of unwanted citizenry.
This was especially apparent at the beginning of 1948. In March, as the Greek government
planned a new round of ‘security arrests,” Charge d’affaires Karl Rankin reported to the
Secretary of State that he had informed Christos Ladas, Under-Secretary to current Greek Prime
Minister Sophoulis that “such arrests were quite necessary and justifiable as long as they were
not of ‘mass’ variety…”236 Marshall approved of the new wave of arrests, but concerned with
bad publicity coming out of Greece he suggested on March 9 that, “unfavorable publicity would
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be minimized if [the] press were…given background details justifying…arrests.”237
Commenting on a rising number of political executions by the Greek government, Rankin
considered Ladas’ plan to start executing prisoners in small groups in order to hurry the process,
a good idea. Rankin wrote to the Secretary of State that Ladas had expected that these executions
“would have a wholesome effect upon the guerillas” and that grouping executions in widely
separated areas might “avoid unfavorable publicity.” Rankin was fine with the fact that many
people in prison or those up for execution might not have been communists, and claimed that
even though “some of those imprisoned and sentenced to death after the December 1944
rebellion may not have been at that time hardened communists, it is unlikely that they have been
able to resist the influence of communist indoctrination organizations existing within most
prisons.”238 In viewing these comments, it is clear that, at least to one American, the execution
of persons solely for their political beliefs was justifiable.
As 1948 unfolded, the military and political situation in Greece looked dire for the Greek
government and the American mission. From October 1947 to March 1948, most of the national
army was relegated to defensive measures against the communist’s DSE, and towards the end of
1948, the situation did not appear to be getting any better.239 This instability led the Americans
to again consider authoritarian measures in November 1948, most notably in their consideration
to allow the “Papagos Solution” whereby king Paul would appoint right-wing General Alexander
Papagos as head of a new cabinet that, lacking support of the Greek parliament, would rule in the
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king’s name. To many Greeks, this must have been another sign that a return of the days of the
Metaxas dictatorship of 1936 was in Greece’s future. Nevertheless, on November 13, 1948
Ambassador Grady wrote to the Secretary of State that, although the U.S. still favored a
“Populist-Liberal coalition government”, if necessary, the U.S. would have “no objections to
[the] appointment [of] Papagos as Commander-in-Chief.”240 Marshall apparently had no
objections to this solution, as evidenced by his letter to king Paul four days later on November
17th in which he wrote that he “sincerely hope[d] that the appointment of General Papagos and
the declaration of martial law [would] bring about a definite improvement.”241 The imposition of
General Papagos as the head of the Greek government did not play out, however, he did take
over the reigns as Commander in Chief of the Greek National Army (GNA) in late January 1949
with quasi-dictatorial powers that gave him the authority to circumvent parliament, exclude
politicians from significant influence, impose martial law, and replace military commanders as
he saw fit.242
Although it was not evident as of yet, the military situation for the GNA became brighter
towards the beginning of 1949. The army offensives from June to September of 1948, originally
viewed as failures because of stalemate, were more effective than was originally assumed. In
June 1948, the Tito-Stalin split forced the Greek communists to choose between supporting
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. The Greek communists had always hoped for aid and
acceptance from Stalin in their plight, but it was never forthcoming. On the other hand, Josip
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Broz Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia’s communist partisans had aided the Greek communists with
weapons, funding, and access to Yugoslavia’s borders during their struggle against the Greek
right. But current KKE General Secretary Nikos Zachariades, who had lived and studied in the
Soviet Union during his youth, was a loyal friend to Stalin. Accordingly, the Greek communists
took Stalin’s side in the rift which subsequently led to the end of all aid received from the
Yugoslavs.243 The previous DAG losses taken during the GNA offensives from June to
September 1948 were more significant when viewed in this light, as Greek communist supply
lines and access to safe harbor in Yugoslavia virtually disappeared overnight. This, along with
General Papagos’ firm command on the military, successful GNA offensives in August 1949,
and Zachariades’ decision to change from guerilla tactics to conventional warfare, ultimately led
to the a quick collapse of partisan warfare in Greece by October 1949.244

The change in U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1947 was drastic. It
brought perceptions on Greece in line with U.S. attitudes and assumptions of Soviet behavior
elsewhere in Europe. The change in American leadership vastly affected the new stance toward
the Soviets, especially regarding Greece. For the Americans, the definition of what constituted
direct evidence of Soviet involvement in Greece was fluid and changed to fit the needs of
policymakers.
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Coupled with the new administration’s tougher stance toward the Soviets, Kennan’s
widely circulated Long Telegram most likely aided in creating American views that blamed
Moscow for Greece’s problems. Ambassador MacVeagh’s transformation is harder to explain,
especially in light of his first-hand accounts of the situation in Greece and his documented
dismissals of Soviet involvement in Greece time and again. It is not possible to prove, but his
time in Washington amongst top policymakers and the President could have influenced his
transformation, though the speed and ease with which this was accomplished is unsettling.
Like the British, the Americans believed that appearances needed to be maintained, and
they tried to conceal what information the public received in order to gain and keep public
approval for their initiatives. Mobilizing public support was not the only cause for controlling
what information reached the public. American statesmen were careful to avoid accusations that
they were interfering in the political affairs of other nations, supporting one side in the domestic
conflict, jettisoning democracy, and that they were apathetic towards the executions of political
prisoners – all of which they accused the Soviets for doing in eastern Europe.
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CONCLUSION

During WWII, Americans in Washington and in the field had surveyed British actions in
Greece with a budding curiosity. The nonchalance with which Greece was discussed in
American diplomatic circles was apparent, with those few exceptions where they felt the need to
criticize the British for their handling of certain situations. Sources on the ground had mostly
scoffed at British claims that the Soviets had a hand in Greece’s problems, time and again.
Once, however, they began to see civil war Greece as part of the global confrontation
with communism, a clear majority of United States governmental elites favored economic and
military aid to the country, regardless of the composition of the Greek government so long as
there were no communists or sympathizers in its ranks. But selling the idea to the public required
a creative marketing campaign that was designed not to inform the public of the geostrategic
realities of the world situation, but rather to put forth a simplistic message that pitted freedom
and democracy against communism and totalitarianism. President Truman’s speech to Congress
essentially reduced the situation in Greece to a distorted picture of a democratic Greece under
threat from an evil minority backed by the Soviets. The fact that U.S. interests were seen as
threatened by the Soviets was not something the U.S. government wished to inform the public of,
most likely because it would have made selling the program more complicated, and hence,
harder to sell. The most clever aspect of Truman’s speech was the way it implicated the Soviets
without blaming them outright.
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Like the British, Americans dealt with inept and corrupt Greek politicians whose goals
were to advance their own careers or to simply rid the country of opposition. In Greece this took
the form of a mostly useless government hardly representative of the broader population, one
that committed wide spread atrocities against not only communists, but anyone perceived to be
sympathetic to their cause. Although the British first, and subsequently the Americans were not
directly pulling the strings to make this happen, their acquiescence in the white terror unleashed
by the shadow state on communists and their sympathizers made the wide-spread violations of
civilian’s rights possible. Once the United States became committed to the defense of Greece, an
“all-in” mentality started to define their actions there. From that point on, neither the corrupt
nature of the Greek government, nor right-wing illegalities were going to stand in the way of
their broader global objectives to halt communism’s perceived advance into the southern Balkan
peninsula. Nor were the sacrifices made by the erstwhile ally in World War II of a one-time ally
going to garner much sympathy from the American government. Much of the former Greek
resistance group EAM/ELAS were forced either to flea the country or face the harsh
consequences of surrender to the Greek government still headed by their worst enemies. To the
Americans, this was of little concern. Their main worry was that if Greek communists gained
power in Greece – even by legal means – it would open a friendly door to the Russians which
would eventually lead to the loss of Greece, the Mediterranean, and eventually the whole Middle
East. This was not an option for the U.S. and is evidenced by their willingness to tolerate the
Greek right-wing, their reluctance to trust their sources on the ground, their creation of an
inaccurate picture to sell their program to congress and the people, and their never-ending
attempts to keep information from reaching the public.
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There was no intelligence failure in Greece. American resources in the field had mostly
given the administration a remarkably clear picture of developments in Greece up until mid1946. But the administration did not manipulate the strain of information reaching them in order
to fit it to their existing needs – they mostly ignored it and formed their own opinions. The
Truman administration committed vast amounts of financial and military resources to the defense
of Greece solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence and the assumption of Soviet intentions,
largely based on how they perceived Soviet actions elsewhere. Certainly, they believed that the
Soviets had designs on Greece even if they couldn’t find the evidence to support their beliefs.
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